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LIMITING LIABILITY THROUGH BANKRUPTCY
Marcus Cole*

INTRODUCTION

In 1819, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a dispute
that would be unimaginable in today's world. The case was Sturges v.
Crowninshield, and involved the discharge of a debt under a New York
insolvency statute.' The facts of the case were not extraordinary: A
merchant-shipowner by the name of Richard Crowninshield shifted his
extensive foreign trade operations from Salem, Massachusetts to the
port of New York, where, on March 22, 1811 , he borrowed $1,543.72
fromJosiah Sturges, expecting little difficulty in repaying him. After all,
at the beginning of 1811, Crowninshield was at the height of prosperity,
with net assets of nearly $200,000, comprised of six ships, goods, and
cash. But the War of 1812 devastated American shipping, and those
heavily invested in it. Just one year after borrowing the money from
Sturges, Crowninshield found himself sitting in New York's debtors'
prison, with debts exceeding his assets by almost $7,000. Crowninshield
was soon to be rescued, however, by a New York insolvency law passed
in 1811. It granted debtors like him a release from debtors' prison, and
a discharge of his remaining obligations.'
Josiah Sturges took exception to the discharge of the sums due him,
and challenged the constitutionality of the New York statute. The
Supreme Court sided with Sturges, holding that Crowninshield's
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1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 123 (1819).
2. MAURICE G. B.AXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 110-12(1966).
3. PETERJ. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT
FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 32-33 (1974).
4. Id. at 33.
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assertion that the discharge freed him from the obligation was
unacceptable. While the Court was in agreement that it would not
permit Crowninshield to escape his obligation to Sturges, the justices
could not agree as to how to the New York statute ran afoul of the
Constitution.
The possibilities stemmed from two different
constitutional provisions. First, the Constitution conferred upon
Congress the exclusive power to enact uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies.6 Second, it also prohibited the states from impairing the
obligations of contracts.7 The inability of the justices to agree as to
which of these two constitutional provisions prohibited the New York
discharge left debtors, creditors, and state legislators with uncertainty as
to whether and how state debtor-creditor laws could be constitutional.
Despite this uncertainty, however, one thing was very clear from the
opinion in Sturges v. Crowninshield: the Court, for the very first time,
nearly thirty years after ratification of the Constitution, had confronted
the question of whether an "insolvency" law and a "bankruptcy" law
were the same thing.
What makes the case unfathomable for the modern imagination are
not the facts, which are ordinary and timeless, but both the issue of law,
and the fact that it had not arisen earlier. Actually, two things are
evident from the circumstances surrounding this case. First, it is clear
that for at least thirty years, creditors, who had the most to gain by
challenging state insolvency laws, had presumed them to be
constitutional. After all, hundreds, if not thousands, of debtors fell
under the "protection" of state insolvency laws each and every year
leading up to the Court's decision in Crowninshield.' Second, the
Crowninshield case demonstrates that in a great many colonial
commercial minds, including the minds of the creditors most affected,
insolvency law and bankruptcy law were two different things..
To the modern bankruptcy lawyer, the idea that bankruptcy law
might be something other than insolvency law is a bizarre notion. We
talk of insolvent individuals and entities as having "gone bankrupt."
Finance literature itself commonly refers to the accouterments of
insolvency as "bankruptcy costs." 9 Newspaper accounts frequently

5. Sturges, 17 U.S. at 208.
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("the Bankruptcy Clause").
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("the Contracts Clause").
8. COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 31. Nearly a decade after its decision in Crouminshield, the Supreme
Court ultimately decided that states had the power to discharge debts arising after the passage of the state
discharge provisions, but only so long as Congress did not pre-empt the field. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213, 269 (1827).
9. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEW:ARTC. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 511-16
(6th ed. 2000).
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describe companies that have become hopelessly encumbered as
"bankrupt," even before any federal court petition is filed. Today,
bankruptcy and insolvency are thought to be synonymous.
If modem notions of insolvency are so inextricably intertwined with
our understanding of bankruptcy, how is it possible that Colonial, and
as will be demonstrated, English lawyers before them, thought of
bankruptcy as something other than insolvency law? Perhaps it was
because bankruptcy law performed a function wholly apart from that
performed by insolvency law. If it did, has this function of bankruptcy
remained a part of its operation in today's economy? Is there some
aspect of bankruptcy law that makes it essential, such that a move
toward contractual or state law insolvency regimes would deprive our
economy of bankruptcy's essential role within it? In short, is there an
essential function that bankruptcy has performed, and continues to
perform, that makes it indispensable?
The purpose of this Article is to expose that function of bankruptcy
law that distinguished it from English and Colonial insolvency law, and
to determine the scope of and need for bankruptcy law to perform that
function in contemporary society. I posit that the distinguishing
character of bankruptcy law was, and continues to be, its ability to serve
as a temporal asset partitioning device. By asset partition, I mean the
ability of a structure to sequester the assets of an owner of an enterprise
from the reach of the creditors of that enterprise, or the assets of the
enterprise from the reach of the creditors of the firm's owners.1 " In
short, bankruptcy law is a limited liability device. It achieves this quality
through the operation of the discharge it affords to debtors falling within
its protective hedge. Bankruptcy law's ability to act as a limited liability
device is what rendered it very useful, if not indispensable, to
commercial existence before the 19th century. It is also this quality that
makes bankruptcy law essential in certain contemporary circumstances,
but superfluous, and perhaps pernicious, in others.
There are two irrefutable truths about modem American bankruptcy.
First, the overwhelming majority of firms that experience financial
failure do not employ or experience the bankruptcy process."
Professors Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen have recently explored
this first truth, and have predicted that corporate bankruptcy's
usefulness will become limited to that of an auction block where
sophisticated creditors and their debtors reach contractual and

10.

E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of OrganizationalLaw, 110 YALE

L.J. 387 (2000).
11. Douglas Baird & Robert Rasmussen, The End of Bankupky, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 752 (2002)
[hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, The End ofBanktupty].
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consensual substitutes for the bankruptcy approach to the problem of
the common pool.' 2 The second truth is that the bankruptcy process
can be used by firms that are not confronting financial failure. These
firms, as well as many individuals, employ bankruptcy to limit liability,
even when they are, not in danger of suffering financial or economic
distress. In short, while most firms that fail do not use bankruptcy, some
firms that use bankruptcy are not in danger of failing. This Article
explores the second of these two truths, examining the ways in which
solvent corporations and individuals use bankruptcy as a temporal asset
partition to limit liability.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I explore the operation
of bankruptcy law as a temporal limited liability device. Bankruptcy can
be distinguished from insolvency in that insolvency is simply a financial
condition of a debtor with liabilities exceeding its assets. With simple
insolvency, an insolvent debtor's- responsibility for satisfaction of its
obligations persists through the period of insolvency, and is extinguished
only upon the death or dissolution of the debtor. Bankruptcy, on the
other hand, is a legal condition of a debtor, one that need not be
insolvent. Bankruptcy acts to terminate a debtor's responsibility to
satisfy its obligations. For human debtors, this discharge grants a "fresh
start," permitting the individual to re-deploy her productive capacities
for the benefit of society. For the corporate debtor, a reorganization is
accompanied by a fictional death and rebirth, allowing the restructured
firm to capture its "going concern value," free from past encumbrances.
Unlike insolvency, the discharge afforded by bankruptcy law acts as a
temporal asset partition that limits a debtor's liability to those claims
that arose before the impenetrable veil of bankruptcy falls. Bankruptcy
protects going concern value from the reach of creditors of the past, and
preserves it for the benefit of the creditors of the future. Bankruptcy is,
in essence, an asset partition.
Part II explains the dual nature of asset partitions. First, I adopt the
3
nomenclature of Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman,'
who define affirmative asset partitions as those that keep firm assets free
from claims of the personal creditors of the firm's owners, and defensive
asset partitions as the opposite: protectingpersonal assets of firm owners
from claims of the firm's creditors. The concept of "limited liability,"
for example, is a form of defensive asset partitioning. Second, I explain
the Hansmann-Kraakman thesis, which asserts that one of those two
functions, affirmative asset partitioning, is the essential role of

12. Id.
13. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10.
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organizational law. 4 The corollary of this thesis is that defensive asset
partitioning is not an essential aspect of organizational law, and is
available through contractual and other means. This section concludes
by characterizing bankruptcy as an extreme form of defensive asset
partitioning, one that is temporal and irreversible.
In Part III, I explore the temporal asset-partitioning history and
character of bankruptcy law, and how it once operated and continues
to serve as a limited liability device. In the terms provided by
Hansmann and Kraakman, bankruptcy can be properly understood as
a drastic form of defensive asset partitioning. Its history, in fact,
supports the Hansmann-Kraakman thesis, in that because it operated
in a world generally without secured credit, it performed a useful but
inadequate commercial function. Early English and colonial American
bankruptcy law was available only to merchants and traders, who were
deemed worthy of this protection because of the unpredictable fortunes
of commerce and markets. Bankruptcy afforded protection of certain
of a businessman's personal assets from the creditors of his business,
assets necessary to pick himself up, dust himself off, and start all over
again. As a limited liability device, then, it could be characterized as
providing defensive asset partitioning. English and early American
bankruptcy law began to die in the colonial period, just as the modern
corporation began to take shape. I posit that it is bankruptcy's failure
to provide affirmative asset partitioning, referred to as "essential" by
Hansmann and Kraakman, that leads to its being supplanted by
organizational law in the 19th century. In fact, bankruptcy law in
America ceased to exist for almost the entirety of the 19th century,
returning to the scene permanently but strangely disfigured in 1898.'5
Part IV explores the modern use, by lawyers, of the asset partitioning
ability of bankruptcy law. I examine five classes of cases where the
commonly held belief that bankruptcy law is a solution to a common
pool problem is demonstrably inaccurate. These cases, categorized as
(1)mass tort bankruptcies, (2) ring-fencing, (3)jurisdiction-jumping by
wealthy deadbeats, (4) "scotchguarding" judgment-resistance, and (5)
retail real estate lease rejection bankruptcies, are all examples involving
the invocation of the bankruptcy process to address concerns other than
a limited, common pool of assets exceeded by the claims against it. The
common thread that unites these contemporary uses of bankruptcy is
instead its operation as a limited liability device, frequently a secondary

14. Id. at394-96.
13. Congress's passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 gave the United States its first permanent
bankruptcy law, one that operated for eighty years. See CharlesJordan Tabb, The Histoty of the Banklrptc.y
Laws ofthe UnitedSlates, 3 Am.BANKR. INsT. L. REV. 3,23-26 (1993).
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or duplicate one. The secondary asset partitioning effect of bankruptcy
creates a clear incentive for questionable forum shopping, where debtors
and affiliated third parties prefer the friendly confines, and vagaries, of
a bankruptcy court in an effort to circumvent the operation of the rule
of law, particularly with respect to priorities, in the non-bankruptcy
world.
Part V considers the three implications that flow from the recognition
of bankruptcy's ability to partition assets. First, I note that if the central
purpose of bankruptcy is to reduce the cost of credit ex ante, and if it
accomplishes this purpose through asset partitioning, then it may be
superfluous, and perhaps pernicious to allow corporations to have access
to it in certain circumstances. This means that corporate insolvency
might better rest within the purview of state law, a position articulated
6
by Professor David Skeel of the University of Pennsylvania.'
The second implication, and corollary of the first, is that bankruptcy
continues to perform as an important asset partition for sole
proprietorships and partnerships.
Businesses employing these
organizational forms should be entitled to invoke the limited liability
afforded by bankruptcy, along with individuals engaged in commercial
investment and speculation. This vision of the purpose of bankruptcy
would also suggest a revisiting of the widely accepted notion of
"consumer bankruptcy," although such an examination is beyond the
scope of this Article.
The third implication of bankruptcy as a limited liability device
involves the current debate over "the end of bankruptcy."17 This debate
revolves around the rise of consensual workouts and prepackaged
chapter 11 plans as alternatives to traditional chapter 11 restructurings.
Proponents of these developments assert that they are more efficient
than traditional chapter 11 reorganizations, and a positive step toward
a world where contract supplants bankruptcy. 8 Viewing bankruptcy as
a limited liability device may add a new perspective on this debate. If
the central purpose of bankruptcy is to reduce the cost of credit ex ante,
and if it performs this function through asset partitioning, and if this
asset partitioning is better performed by organizational law, and
furthermore, ifbankruptcy's ancillary purposes (restructuring)are better
performed by contract, then who needs bankruptcy law? In short, the

16. See David K. Skeel,Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and CorporateBankrupty, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 471 (1994) (urging transfer of the bankruptcy power to state control).
17. Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptc, supra note 11, at 751.
18. Id. at 752; see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice. A Menu Approach to Coiporate Banklrptcy,
71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 100-107 (1992) and Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankrupty, 107

YALE Lj. 1807 (1998).
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third implication is that, while it may be accurate to view the widespread
use of corporate bankruptcy law as something that is dying, as Professors
Baird and Rasmussen suggest, it may be more appropriate to view its
widespread use as something to be killed.
I. WHAT DOES BANKRUPTCY

Do?

A. The Common Pool Paradigm
When ThomasJackson published The Logic andLimitsofBankruptcy Law
in 1986, he framed virtually all bankruptcy scholarship that would
follow for the next fifteen years.' 9 Jackson's take on bankruptcy was that
it was a non-exclusive solution to a common pool problem, and that for
it to be at all effective, it must reflect what creditors might have agreed
to had they been able to get together before hand.2" This "creditors'
bargain" approach to bankruptcy has divided the world of bankruptcy
academics into two camps: the "Law and Economics" scholars who
appear to adopt the creditors' bargain as the essential purpose of
bankruptcy, and the "Progressives" who contend that the purpose of
bankruptcy is to promote social welfare, ordering and redistribution that
is not politically feasible through other means."' The common pool,
according to the Progressives, should be shared by more claimants than
the Law and Economics scholars are willing to acknowledge.22
Both sides of the spectrum share one thing in common: Jackson's
characterization of bankruptcy as a solution to the common pool
problem that arises when a debtor's liabilities exceed its assets. This
understanding of bankruptcy has led Professor Robert Rasmussen to
advocate contractual, or privately packaged reorganizations over
judicially supervised chapter 11 reorganizations.23 He argues that
debtors and their creditors are more efficient at restructuring troubled
firms, and that their contractual solutions are better than "creditors'
bargains" in the Jacksonian sense. Professors Douglas Baird and
Rasmussen have recently embarked on an extension of this argument,
19. THOMIAS H.JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMIITS OF BA.KRUPTCY LAW\" (1986). Jackson's theor'
of the creditors' bargain was actually developed in an earlier article. See Thomas H.Jackson, Bankrtptcy, .on-

Bankrupt. Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE LJ. 837 (1982).
20. Id. at 16-17 ("The single most fruitful way to think about bankruptcy is to see it as ameliorating
a common pool problem created by a system of individual creditor remedies.").

21.

See, for example, Karen Gross, The ,\Need to Take Conununiy Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy: An

Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994).
22. KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS, 13 (1996); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case

for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE LJ. 437 (1992).
23.

See Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 100- 10 1.
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trumpeting the "End of Bankruptcy," and pointing to the explosion of
"pre-packaged" bankruptcies and private work-outs that have
supplanted and circumvented the operation of chapter 11.2 According
to Baird and Rasmussen, the contractualization of bankruptcy has
enhanced the control creditors enjoy in those cases where their debtors
fall within the chapter 11 process.23 These developments have alarmed
the Progressives, who believe that "private" corporate bankruptcy
undermines the public policy objectives and third party non-creditor
stakeholder interests that are to be advanced through judicially
administered bankruptcy.26
Several scholars have questioned the "common pool" paradigm that
reigns over bankruptcy scholarship. Each has identified the source of
the collective action fixation within the literature as stemming largely
from the widespread association of bankruptcy with insolvency.28 But
what if bankruptcy, in the English and American tradition, has an
important or even essential role apart from its function as a solution to
a collective action problem? The answer to this question lies in an
examination of how bankruptcy is used. Such an examination reveals
that the purpose of bankruptcy frequently is not to solve a common pool
problem, but rather, to operate as a device to limit liability, one that is
often necessary to facilitate commercial activity.
B. The Essential Characterof Bankruptcy Law
Bankruptcy limits liability. It does this by erecting a legal partition
between assets against which past creditors have claims, and "going
concern value" or future assets, against which only future creditors can
seek satisfaction. The separation of past assets and claims from future
assets and claims is the very characteristic that distinguishes bankruptcy
from insolvency. It is this temporal characteristic that makes bankruptcy
a drastic, irreversible legal partition.29 A firm or individual may cycle in

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. SeeWarren, The Untenable Casefor Repeal of Chapter 11, supra note 22, at 439.
27. See,e.g.,Barn. Adler, Financial and Political Theories ofAmenican Coiporate Banknspty, 45 STAN. L. REX.
311(1993); Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 101; Randal C. Picker, Securiy Interests, Misbehatiot; and Common
PoohL,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1992); and Randal C. Picker, Voluntaty Petitions and the Creditos'Baigain,61 U.

CIN. L. REV. 519 (1992).
28. Professor Adler presents a more complete attack on the common pool paradigm in his
forthcoming book, THE LA" OF L\'ST RE.SORT (chapter on file with author).
29. The substance of the current article has been dramatically rewritten to recognize the temporal
nature of the asset partitioning performed by bankruptcy, as pointed out by Professor David Skeel's
symposium remarks regarding this Article.
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and out of insolvency frequently, as much as several times a year,
month, or even within a day.30 This "solvency cycling" is ubiquitous,
and uneventful, as long as the debtor in question sustains periods of
solvency to offset the periods of insolvency. The important thing to
remember about insolvency is that it exists all around us, and very rarely
involves bankruptcy law or bankruptcy procedures. Insolvency need not
be a common pool problem, so long as the common pool is a "living and
breathing" one. If the assets to which creditors can look to satisfy their
claims have a good possibility of expanding, then insolvency is merely
a fleeting inconvenience. Insolvency becomes a common pool problem
when the common pool of assets is "frozen," in other words, not
permitted to expand or contract. This happens when a person dies, a
corporation is dissolved, faces imminent dissolution, or when a
bankruptcy petition is filed.
But a bankruptcy petition can be filed, and frequently is filed, by
persons and companies well outside the realm of insolvency. 3 ' These
debtors resort to bankruptcy, not because of the existence of a common
pool problem, but because of bankruptcy's ability to partition the past
from the future. Solvent debtors file bankruptcy to limit liability, not to
solve a common pool problem. On the other hand, the vast majority of
insolvent debtors never resort to a bankruptcy filing.32 The simple truth
about bankruptcy and insolvency is this: an insolvent debtor need not be
bankrupt, and a bankrupt debtor need not be insolvent.
The distinction between the condition that we know of as
"insolvency" and that we know of as "bankruptcy" helps us to
understand the difference between insolvency law and bankruptcy law.
We can think of insolvency law as the law of debtors and creditors that
governs the satisfaction of claims, but does not discharge them in the
absence of satisfaction. Insolvent debtors are still liable for claims
against them, and will have to Satisfy those claims from future assets if
present assets are insufficient to satisfy those claims. 33 Bankruptcy law,
on the other hand, can be thought of as law that effects a discharge of
claims, whether or not they are satisfied in full, and prohibits future

30. The condition of "living paycheck-to-paycheck" is perhaps the most common example of
solvency cycling within the period of a month. The recent phenomenon of "day traders" provides an
example of solvency cycling within a day.
31. Section 301 of the Bankruptcy Code places no insolvency requirement on a debtor seeking to file
a voluntary petition. I I U.S.C. §301 (2002). Section 303 does, however, place some showing of insolvency,
albeit a crude one, upon creditors seeking to force- a debtor into bankruptcy through the filing of an
involuntary petition. SeeI I U.S.C. § 303(h) (2002).
at 753.
32. SeeBaird & Rasmussen, The End qfBankupty, supra note I1,
33. Garnishment law is an example of insolvency law that taps future income to satisfy past
obligations.
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assertion of those discharged claims.34 Bankruptcy limits a debtor's
liability on past and present claims to an artificially fixed and static,
current pool of assets. It also prevents claimants on that pool from
reaching the debtor's future assets or going concern value unless they
exchange their past positions for new ones. This separation of past
claims and assets from future claims and assets is also irreversible.3"
Bankruptcy is, in effect, a limited liability device, and a drastic one at
that.
That bankruptcy is a limited liability device is not a new assertion; it
dates at least as far back as 1827, when the Supreme Court finally
resolved the issue as to whether bankruptcy laws and insolvency laws
were the same thing. In Ogden v. Saunders, the Court concluded that
while states could enact insolvency laws that regulated affairs between
debtors and creditors generally, a law that discharged a debt was a
bankruptcy law.36 The Bankruptcy Clause prohibits states from
enacting such laws if Congress pre-empted them by passing its own
discharge law.37 According to the Ogden court, a bankruptcy law, by
discharging a debt, limited the debtor's liability on the obligation in a
way that insolvency law did not. 8 In the absence of a discharge, an
insolvent debtor's liability on an obligation persisted until his ship came
in.
At least one modern commentator has also characterized bankruptcy
as a form of limited liability.39 As a limited liability device, bankruptcy
can be said to do what other limited liability devices, such as the
corporate veil, accomplish: they partition assets to which certain
creditors look for satisfaction from other assets which are shielded from
their reach. Bankruptcy, as a limited liability device, is an asset
partition.

34. Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for both the discharge of claims asserted in a
bankruptcy proceeding, as well as a prohibition on the assertion of those claims at any point in time after the
conclusion of the case. SeeII U.S.C. § 524 (2002).
35. Reaffirmation of a discharged debt may be viewed as a reversal of the effect of a bankruptcy
discharge, but is perhaps more accurately viewed as a new obligation between parties to the discharged
obligation. SeeII U.S.C. § 524(l) (2002).
36. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 269 (1827).
37. Id. at 270.
38. Id.
39. See Douglas G. Baird, A World Without BanbuIpty, 50 LAw & Co.NTE.P. PROBS. 173 (1987).
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II. BANKRUPTCY AS ASSET PARTITION
A. Asset PartitioningDefined
Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman undertook the
most thorough explication of asset partitioning in their recent article,
The Essential Role of OrganizationalLaw.' Hansmann and Kraakman
define asset partitioning as the designation of a separate pool of assets
that are available to satisfy claims by a firm's creditors, distinct from the
personal assets of the firm's owners and managers, and the assignment
of priorities in the resultant distinct pools of assets.4 When a firm is
owned as a freestanding legal entity, the assets owned by that entity in
its own name become a separate pool of firm assets, distinct from the
personal assets of any of the owners of the firm.42
The latter part of the Hansmann-Kraakman definition of asset
partitioning is the assignment ofpriorities to creditors with respect to the
segregated asset pools. This second aspect of asset partitioning takes two
forms. The first assignment of priorities is to the creditors of the firm
with regard to the assets associated with the firm's operations. Firm
creditors, in other words, have a right to have their claims satisfied from
the firm's assets before the personal creditors of the firm's owners can
have resort to those assets. This priority allows potential firm creditors
to make assessments about the risks associated with extension of credit
to the firm.4" For this reason, these firm assets can be thought of as
"bonding assets." 44 Hansmann and Kraakman designate this function
as "affirmative asset partitioning," to reflect the bonding for the firm's
obligations.45
A second form of asset partitioning is the opposite of the first. It
sections off the personal assets of the firm's owners, and grants priority
in those personal assets to the personal creditors of the firm's owners.
Personal assets perform the bonding function for the personal creditors
of the firm's owners, giving them a basis upon which to make personal
credit determinations. We can think of this form of asset partitioning as
"limited liability," and for this reason, Hansmann and Kraakman have

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra
note 10, at 392.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 392.
Id. at 393.
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labeled it "defensive asset partitioning."416 The characteristics of each

form of asset partitioning are addressed in turn.
B. The Two Forms ofAsset Partitioning
1. Affirmative Asset Partitioning
Affirmative asset partitioning can be best understood in the context
of the corporate form of business ownership. The formation of a
corporation assigns a priority in that corporation's assets to claims of the
corporation's creditors.47 The principal benefits of affirmative asset
partitioning lie within its ability to reduce costs. First, asset partitions
reduce the costs of creditor monitoring.48 A creditor to a business
operated by a sole proprietor, for example, must be familiar with, and
keep informed about, the economic prospects for the business and its
industry. But a creditor of a sole proprietorship must also monitor the
personal affairs of the proprietor, since mismanagement of those affairs
will cause personal creditors to have access to the assets of the business
to which our firm's creditor has extended credit. A creditor to a
corporation, on the other hand, can dispense with the need for such
monitoring of the personal affairs of the firm's owner or owners.
Instead, the creditor can gain a more accurate assessment of the risks of
credit associated with the business and its markets, since the partition
afforded by the corporate veil shields the firm's assets from personal
credit risks and circumstances.49 These monitoring cost savings are
multiplied when we factor in additional owners of the firm.
Likewise, firms engaged in disparate industries with unrelated
operations and prospects impose more monitoring costs on the firm's
potential creditors. In order to accurately assess the risks of credit
extension, potential creditors must learn all there is to know about all of
the various enterprises in which the firm is engaged. A firm can reduce
this cost of monitoring to its creditors by partitioning the assets of each
endeavor into subsidiary corporations, allowing each creditor to focus
on one type of operation within one particular industry. Multiple
owners and multiple enterprises, then, could present. potentially
insurmountable monitoring costs in the absence of effective affirmative
asset partitioning. While affirmative asset partitioning has other benefits

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 399-405.
Id. at 401-03.
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as well, its ability to reduce monitoring costs is the one function that is
difficult to duplicate through contractual means. It is for this reason that
Hansmann and Kraakman identify affirmative asset partitioning as the
essential role of organizational law.50
2. Defensive Asset Partitioning
Defensive asset partitioning, like affirmative asset partitioning, can be
best understood through the lens of the corporate form. In a
corporation, the creditors of the business have no claim upon the
personal assets of the firm's shareholders. 3 ' These personal shareholder
assets are instead pledged exclusively to the personal creditors of those
shareholders in the event of personal insolvency. 52 This exclusive form
of defensive asset partitioning has come to be referred to as "limited
liability., 53 But limited liability is not the only form of defensive asset
partitioning, which can range from that extreme of exclusivity, to
intermediate and nonexistent protection of owner assets from firm
creditors.34 The reason for this variety is due to the relative costs and
benefits of the various levels of defensive asset partitioning.
The costs associated with defensive asset partitioning derive
principally from the incentives and possibilities it creates for owners of
a firm to behave opportunistically with respect to the firm's creditors.
First, a fundamental principle of finance is that residual claimants on a
firm, because of their exclusive claim to any potential upside in the
fortunes of the firm, have an incentive to undertake riskier projects than
would be preferred by creditors of the firm, who receive fixed
compensation and enjoy none of potential upside that exceeds their
claims.55 Limited liability means that if risky projects do not pan out,
both creditors and residual claimants share the loss, but only to the
extent of their investment in the firm. a6 With all of the upside, but only
a share of the downside, owners of the firm can be said to enjoy an
option on the value of the firm. The resultant divergence between the
interests of the firm's owners and the firm's creditors that this option

50. Id.
51. Id. at 397.

52. id.
53. Id.
54. General partnerships and sole proprietorships, for example, provide no defensive asset
partitioning. SeeLarry E. Ribstein, PartnerBankrupty and the Federalizationof PartnershipLaw, 33 WAKE FOREST

L. REV. 795, 800-01 (1998).
55. BREALEY & MYERS, supranote 9, at 482-484.
56. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 396.
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creates, can be seen as a cost of defensive asset partitioning which is
borne by all investors in the firm.
Another related cost of defensive asset partitioning resides in the
direct conflict between the interests of the firm's owners and the firm's
creditors. This clash can manifest itself with the owner's incentives to
deplete the resources of the firm in anticipation of insolvency, or by
converting those assets into a form inaccessible to the firm's creditors
(i.e., the leisure enjoyed through shirking). In either event, these
potential distributions of the firm's assets to the owners of the firm
represent a cost of defensive asset
partitioning, a cost which must
57
manifest itself in the cost of credit.
In order for defensive asset partitioning to exist in the face of its costs,
it must produce benefits that exceed them. In truth, defensive asset
partitioning, in the form of limited liability, has many benefits that
explains its existence. First, as is true with its affirmative mirror image,
defensive asset partitioning reduces monitoring costs. Defensive asset
partitioning, in the form of limited liability, allows personal creditors of
firm owners to focus attention on the assets of those owners. 3' Limited
liability also reduces monitoring costs for the firm's owners.5 9 In the
absence of limited liability, each owner of the firm would need to
monitor, not only the fortunes of the firm, but the assets and liabilities
of their co-owners as well. 6
Second, limited liability reduces decision-making costs by
homogenizing the interests of the owners of the firm. Distributions to
shareholders in a corporation are treated equally, without the need for
costly managerial determinations or lobbying.6 Third, in firms with a
separation of ownership and control, limited liability shifts some of the
costs of monitoring the professional managers of a firm from the firm's
owners to the firm's creditors.62 If creditors of the firm know that they
have recourse only to assets of the firm, then they are more likely to
scrutinize the activities of the managers, both before and after the
extension of credit. The firm's dispersed owners can "free ride," to
some extent, on the less-dispersed creditors' monitoring efforts.6 A
fourth benefit of limited liability is that it avoids the costly process of
prosecuting and executing judgments against the firm's owners. If the
57. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATION LmW, 44 (1991).
58. Id.
59. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 41.
60. Id. at 41-42; seealso Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 396.
61. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 42.
62. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 395.
63. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 42-43.
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number of owners of a firm is very large, this cost can be large relative
to the amount collected.
A fifth benefit of limited liability is that it facilitates the transfer of firm
ownership.64 Potential claimants on the assets of a firm without
defensive asset partitioning are entitled to have their claims satisfied by
the personal assets of the firm's owners. Potential buyers of shares in
such a firm are unable to know with any accuracy the extent to which
co-owners will be able to shoulder the liability load. Some of these coowners may be looking to free ride on the assets of the potential buyer
and other co-owners. Only knowledge of the holdings of other owners
can provide potential buyers with an understanding of the risk they are
about to undertake, and how to price it. Defensive asset partitioning
provides just such a fix on this risk, enabling markets for trading firm
ownership to develop.65
A sixth and final benefit of defensive asset partitioning, in the form of
limited liability, is its ability to permit a firm's owners to control the risks
they are willing to bear with respect to the firm. Owners can shift more
or less assets into the firm with respect to creditors or other owners,
depending upon how much they wish to put at risk within that particular
firm. The absence of limited liability would expose all of a particular
owner's assets to the risks of the enterprise, leaving nothing for the
owner to decide with respect to the amount which she would like to
expose to the firm's prospects.66
III. BANKRUPTCV AS A TEMPORAL DEFENSIVE ASSET PARTITION
The Hansmann-Kraakman thesis of the essential role of
organizational law is supported by, and consistent with, the history of
English and American bankruptcy law and the origins of the modem
corporate form. The corporation became a formidable commercial
force just as bankruptcy law was proving unwieldy as an asset
partitioning device. In a very real sense, however, we can think of the
corporation as the natural successor to English and early American
bankruptcy law, because it was able to provide what bankruptcy law
could not: affirmative asset partitioning, plus more flexible defensive
partitioning.

64. See
Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the 7heoy oftheFirm, 141J. INSTIT'L&THEORETICAL
ECON. 601, 601 (1985); seealso EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 42-43.
65. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 43.
66. Id. at 43-44.
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A. The Bankruptcy Precursorto the Corporation
Bankruptcy's ability to operate as a limited liability device is difficult
to imagine when viewed through the lens of modern corporate
bankruptcy, in large part because we envision the bankruptcy of an
insolvent firm as the transfer of all residual ownership in the firm's assets
to the holders of claims against those assets.67 But business bankruptcy
law did not always entail this "lock-stock-and-barrel" transfer of
ownership from shareholders to creditors, and in some cases, it does not
follow this paradigm today. To understand how bankruptcy can
operate as a limited liability device, a defensive asset partition if you will,
it is helpful to consider a time when business and individual bankruptcy
were one and the same: early English and colonial American
bankruptcy.
1. English Bankruptcy: Merchants and Traders Only
While bankruptcy law, in one form or another, is thought to be
thousands of years old, English law's adoption of it placed an indelible
and lasting mark upon it. From its very beginnings, English bankruptcy
law applied only to merchants and traders. 8 These individuals were
deemed to be the only economic actors in society whose personal
financial circumstances needed to be shielded from the volatilities of
commerce and commercial speculation. Ordinary debtors, not engaged
in trade, were not entitled to bankruptcy treatment, and the protection
afforded by its discharge. According to Blackstone, the laws of England
were:
cautious of encouraging prodigality and extravagance by this
indulgence to debtors; and therefore they allow the benefit of the laws
of bankruptcy to none but actual traders; since that set of men are,
generally speaking, the only persons liable to accidental losses, and to

an inability of paying their debts, without any fault of their own. If
persons in other situations of life run in debt without the power of
payment, they must take the consequences of their own indiscretion,
even though they meet with sudden accidents that may reduce their
fortunes: for the law holds it to be an unjustifiable practice, for any
person but a trader to encumber himself with debts of any

67. Adler, supranote 26, at 314; see alsoJackson, Bankruptcy, .,Vn-Banknspty Entitlements, and the Credikas'
Bargain, supra note 19, at 857.
68. w.J.JoNEs, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ENGISH BANKRUPTCY:. STATUTFS AND COMMISSIONS
IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD, 5 (1979); see also, HUGH BARTY-KING, THE WORST POVERTY: A

HISTORY OF DEBT AND DEBTORS, 15-16 (1991).
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considerable value. If a gentleman, or one in a liberal profession, at
the time of contracting his debts, has a sufficient fund to pay them, the
delay of payment is a species of dishonesty, and a temporary injustice
to his creditor: and if, at such time, he has no sufficient fund, the
dishonesty and injustice is the greater. He cannot therefore murmur,
if he suffers the punishment which he has voluntarily drawn upon
himself. But in mercantile transactions the case is far otherwise. Trade
cannot be carried on without mutual credit on both sides: the
contracting of debts is therefore here not only justifiable but necessary.
And if accidental calamities, as by loss of a ship in a tempest, the
failure of brother traders, or by the nonpayment of persons out of
trade, a merchant or trader becomes incapable
of discharging his own
69
debts, it is his misfortune and not his fault.
This quote from Blackstone reveals a clear understanding of
bankruptcy law as an asset partition, designed to provide limited liability
exclusively for merchants and traders. Since the inception of its
discharge, bankruptcy has acted as a partition between the future assets
of a bankrupt debtor and the past claims against that debtor. By
shielding future income from past claims,. bankruptcy limits liability on
those claims.
Bankruptcy law provided this form of limited liability in the following
way. Suppose an individual found himself hopelessly encumbered by
debt. If he were unable to qualify for bankruptcy relief as a trader or
merchant, he was susceptible of "having the bailiff in the house," to
gather up his possessions on writ of execution on ajudgment secured by
one or more of his creditors, "to be sold up" for the benefit of those
creditors.7" If our debtor's personal belongings were insufficient to bring
enough from a bailiff's sale to satisfy the claims of his creditors, he stood
the risk of confinement in debtors' prison.7 ' Our unfortunate debtor
could avoid debtors' prison by fleeing the country in a form of selfimposed banishment, by seeking the increasingly limited sanctuary
found behind church doors, or by "keeping house," a form of selfimposed house arrest that took advantage of the common law's
prohibition on the entering of a man's house to serve civil process.72
Our debtor would be plagued by these possibilities for as
long as his
73
indebtedness lasted, even if it lasted for the rest of his life.

69.

WILLIA.iBLCKSTONE,2CO.lIME TARIESON THEL .wsOFENGLND 473(1765-1769) (1858).
70. GEORGE EuoT, THE MILL ON THEFLoSS, bk. 4, ch. 3, at 332 (1992).
71. SeeJay Cohen, The History of Impisonment for Deb and its Relation to the Development of the Dschmege, 3
J. LEGALHIST. 153, 158-159 (1982).
72. Id. at 158.
73. Id. at 159; seealso BARTY-KING, THE WORST POVERTY, supra note 68, at 14.
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Things would be very different for our debtor, however, if he were a
merchant or trader. The Statute of 13 Elizabeth, enacted in 1570,
provided that only traders and merchants, persons who earned their
living "buying and selling," were eligible for bankruptcy.74 To be sure,
the debtor's creditors would have resort to most of the debtor's assets,7
personal and business assets alike, without distinction for the most part. 1
The creditors could access most, but not all of the debtor's assets,
because merchants and traders were deemed critical, as businessmen,
to the fortunes of the whole society. In order to preserve their
contributions to society, it was necessary for bankruptcy law to shield
certain property from the reach of creditors. 76 This property, which the
law deemed "exempt" from the reach of creditors, typically included the
merchant's tools of trade, clothing, scriptures, and other personal
property that would permit the businessman
to start anew, returning to
77
productive service to the economy.
But what if our merchant's assets, excluding those necessary for him
to continue to devote his productive capacities to the common weal,
were insufficient to satisfy his creditors? Would he be relegated to
working for his creditors until the end of his days? Or would he
recognize the hopelessness of his circumstance, choose to give up his
trade, and live off of the alms of others, or assets sequestered from
creditors?
While early English bankruptcy was limited to merchants and traders,
it failed to address the difficulty of hopelessly encumbered but otherwise
productive men of commerce. In order to preserve these capacities for
the benefit of society, Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne in 1704.78
It created a right of discharge for honest but unfortunate merchants and
traders, as an incentive to cooperate with their creditors.79 It also gave
our merchant the incentive to return his entrepreneurial shoulder to the

74. 13 Eliz., cap 7 (1370). Although the Statute of 13 Elizabeth is widely regarded as the first English
bankruptcy statute, that distinction is more properly hung, given the definition advanced in this Article, on
the bankruptcy act of 1543. The 1543 statute, passed during the "benevolent despotism" of Henry NIII,
afforded a discharge to "commercial men" only, and was the first to provide for pro rata distributions to
creditors. JONES, supra
note 68, at 11-16. See also CharlesJordan Tabb, The Histoiy of the Bankmpty Laws in
the UnitedStates, 3 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
75. BARTY-KING, supra note 68, at 68 ("execution could be taken out against any of his possessions
except his wearing apparel, bedding for himself and family, and the tools of his trade.").

76. Cohen, supra note 71, at 158.
77. BARTY-KING, supra note 68, at 68.
78. See Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the Histoy of the Voidable
lIference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 30 (1986).
79. Id.
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wheel of commerce, with the assurance that all new business would be
conducted on a clean slate."0
Under English law, bankruptcy law was business law. As business
law, bankruptcy's discharge was, and is, a form of limited liability.
2. Colonial Understandings
Like many things in colonial America, bankruptcy law was distinctly
English, reserving its discharge, and the limited liability that it
represented, for the benefit of merchants and traders. The colonists
were too dependent upon the flow of capital and credit from England
to make any significant changes, or waves.81 When the colonies became
so well established that their survival was no longer in doubt, they
developed their own bankruptcy laws, which largely tracked the logic,
if not the form, of their English precursor.8 2 That logic entailed four
objectives. The first was to protect society from the volatilities to which
staple-oriented economies were subject when crop failures or wars
disrupted normal production and trading activities.83 Second, these laws
sought to mitigate the severity of creditor remedies that might deprive
society of the productive capacities ofthe merchant-debtor. Third, they
sought to avoid the chain reaction that might result from the failure of
a single merchant or planter by spreading the losses equitably among all
creditors.8 4 Finally, they advanced the original purpose of the discharge:
to give "producers," merchants, traders, and now planters, the incentive
and opportunity to produce once again, free from the misfortunes of the
past.
The American Revolution changed very little about bankruptcy law
or its purposes. 6 There was some discrimination against Tory creditors
after the war, but there were no formal repudiations of pre-war debts,
and even the Treaty of Paris in 1783 provided for their payment.87 The
principal effect of the revolution was the fact that each state was left to
its own devices when it came to crafting the bounds of the relations
between its debtors and its creditors. This, in turn, meant that creditors
extending credit beyond state lines faced uncertainty with regard to the

80. Id. at 31.
81. See COLEMAN, su'a note 3, at 6 (1974).
82. Id. at 31.
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id.
86. Hoppit makes the opposite claim with respect to English bankruptcy law. See Hoppit, supra note
81,at 122-27.
87. COLEMAN, sutwa note 3, at 16.
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applicable law governing collection of debts. In order to engage in
interstate commerce, creditors had to keep abreast of disparities between
regimes. 88 A national, uniform bankruptcy law could have solved this
problem, but that was virtually impossible under the Articles of
Confederation.89 Such a question would have required unanimous
approval of the states, and if anything is true about the history of
American bankruptcy law, it is that it has been acrimoniously
controversial since the founding of the republic.
The need for certainty in interstate credit transactions led to the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution. It authorizes
Congress "[t]o establish.., uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States." 9 The framers of the Constitution in
1787 devoted very little of their deliberations to the Bankruptcy Clause,
and there is no evidence that the ratifying conventions of the states gave
much thought to it either.9 A conclusory remark made by James
Madison in Federalist Number 42 is the only reference to the
Bankruptcy Clause in the Federalist Papers. There, Madison asserts
that "[t]he power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent
so many frauds where parties or their property may lie or be removed
into different States, that
the expediency of it seems not likely to be
92
drawn into question."
What was meant by "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies,"
could, however, be drawn into question. An "originalist" interpretation
of the Clause might insist that what the framers had in mind was the
system of bankruptcy prevailing at the time. This presumption,
however, requires us to answer yet another question: "prevailing
where?" Did the framers, by reference to "bankruptcy laws," mean laws
bearing that particular label, reflecting their understanding of the
compulsory, involuntary form of proceeding confined to traders and
merchants under English law?93 Or did the framers mean to confer

88. Id. at 12.
89. Id. at 17. See also F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE. OF THE
CONSTITLTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 74(1918).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES

HISTORY 4-8 (1933); F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAw 76-81 (1919); Vern
Countryman,A Histoy ofAmeiamBand, ptcy Law, Co.i. LJ. 226 (June/July 1976).
91. NOEL, supra note 90, at 77.
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (1961).
93. See COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 18. According to Professor Charles Warren, "It is highly probable
that the attention of the framers was chiefly centered on bankruptcy in relation to commerce, and that the
exercise of the [bankruptcy] power was conceived as primarily for the benefit of the commercial class of
creditors and debtors, as in England." W,'ARREN, supra note 90, at 7.
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upon Congress the power to promulgate laws concerning insolvency
generally?
If the framers of the Bankruptcy Clause meant to give Congress the
power to govern insolvency, then they intended to grant sweeping
powers to the central government by the standard prevailing at the time.
Insolvency laws governed the affairs of individuals unable to claim the
special status and limited liability afforded to merchants and traders
under the bankruptcy laws. Among the states, there was no prevailing
practice with respect to insolvency. The colonies maintained widest
variation. 4 Three of the thirteen colonies had laws discharging
insolvents of their debts. 5 Six of the colonies gave full relief only for
select insolvents, and then only during sporadic periods. 6 Four of the
colonies never bothered to enact insolvency legislation. 7
The distinction between bankruptcy laws and insolvency laws was
quite real at the time of the framing. Pennsylvania, in fact, had two
distinct regimes: a bankruptcy system and an insolvency system.9 8 As
noted earlier, the idea that the Bankruptcy Clause did not empower
Congress to enact insolvency laws was tested in Sturges v. Crowninshield.99
The'very existence of dual regimes to govern insolvency and bankruptcy
independently, and the litigation in the nation's highest court over
whether these terms were synonymous, provide insight into the way
early Americans viewed bankruptcy law and insolvency law.
Bankruptcy law provided limited liability for businessmen, and their
creditors, who could find it nowhere else at the time.
3. The Corporate Successor to Bankruptcy
The monopoly that bankruptcy held over the highly coveted supply
of limited liability was soon to be broken. Corporations were quite
uncommon before 1800, and the few that existed were not business
corporations.' °°
Almost all colonial corporations were either

governmental subunits or eleemosynary institutions: churches and
charities. In England, only the crown had the right to incorporate.
After the Revolution, it was generally understood that state legislatures
were the arm of government vested with the power to make

94. WARREN, supra note 90, at 6-7.
95.

COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 14 (Rhode Island and the Carolinas).

96. Id. at 272.

97. Id.
98. WARREN, supra note 90, at 6-7.
99. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
100. LWRENCE NI. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF A.MERICAN L.\w 188 (2d ed. 1985).
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corporations.' Even with this expansion of power, in all of 2the 18th
century, only 335 businesses were issued corporate charters.1
Things changed in the 19th century. More charters were issued to
businesses, primarily those engaged in banking, transportation
infrastructure, or water provision." 3 In Pennsylvania, for example,
2,333 business corporations were chartered between 1790 and 1860.1°4
These special acts of the legislature were supplanted by the passage of
general incorporation statutes, which facilitated the incorporation of
dramatically more firms. In 1811, New York passed a Manufacturing
Act, which permitted the incorporation of any manufacturing business
for a term of twenty years with the simple filing of a certificate.' 5 This
is considered the first general business incorporation statute, and was
followed by competing statutes in other jurisdictions." 6
Neither the New York act, nor any of its competitors, provided for
limited liability at first. 07
' This feature of the modern corporation would
develop slowly over the course of the 19th century. The rise of the
limited liability corporation brought with it affirmative asset
partitioning. With these dual forms of asset partitioning available
through the corporate form, bankruptcy as asset partition lost its central
place in American business. The development of secured credit in the
20th century afforded affirmative asset partitioning through means other
than the corporate form. Together, bankruptcy and secured credit
could have offered American businesses defensive and affirmative asset
partitioning, respectively. Early forms of secured credit were viewed
with suspicion, however. By the time security interests came to be seen
as something other than fraudulent, bankruptcy was already out of
fashion as the primary limited liability device in commerce."0 8 Unlike
American partnership law, however, which lost its ability to afford
defensive asset partitioning with the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy

101. JOHN W. CADMANJR., THE CORPORATION IN NEWJERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS 17911875 (1949).
102. FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 189.
103. Id. at 188.
104. Id. at 189; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 12
(1991).
105. Id. at 195.
106. Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. LXVII, §§ 1, 1811 N.Y. Laws 11I (authorizing corporate formation
without a special charter to "manufactur[e] woolen, cotton, or linen goods"); see Susan Pace Hamill, Fom
Special hitilege to General Utilit: A Continuationof IVillard Hurst'sStudy of Coporations,49 Am. U. L. REV. 81, 101

(1999).
107. Herbert Hovenkamp, The ClassicalCorporationin American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. LJ. 1593, 165354(1988).
108. The United States was without a permanent bankruptcy law until passage ofthe Bankruptcy Act
of 1898. See Tabb, supra note 74, at 5.
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Code, American bankruptcy preserved and expanded its ability to afford
limited liability. A parallel evolution took place in England. Just
seventeen years after the passage of Britain's first general incorporation
statute in 1844, and six years after the passage of the Limited Liability
Act of 1855, Parliament officially abolished the distinction between
insolvency and bankruptcy.'° Bankruptcy was suddenly available to
anyone, without regard to commercial activity. While Victorian
bankruptcy became increasingly associated with consumers, businesses
looked to the more effective means of partitioning assets available
through organizational law. The corporate form had supplanted
bankruptcy as the asset partition of choice on both sides of the Atlantic.
B. The PreservationofAsset Partitioningin Modern Bankruptcy Law
Asset partitioning in modem bankruptcy law can be thought of as the
product of the confluence of three acts of Congress: the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, the Chandler Act of 1938 and sections 301 through 303 of the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978.110 These three statutes expanded bankruptcy

relief to corporate debtors, including those seeking restructuring, and
detached bankruptcy relief, at least formally, from insolvency."' The
absence of an insolvency requirement, when coupled with departures
from non-bankruptcy priorities, preserves bankruptcy's role as an asset
partitioning device.
Solvent debtors employing bankruptcy to
manipulate state law priorities can preserve a portion of future assets for
the benefit of pre-bankruptcy managers and junior stakeholders. The
evolution of bankruptcy legislation that dispensed with absolute priority
and proof of insolvency, then, has preserved bankruptcy's early
character as a temporal asset partition.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the product of.a long struggle,
primarily between northeastern financial interests, and southern
agricultural concerns. When it was adopted, it captured the relations
between small businesses and their financiers, as well as providing for
the treatment of individuals. The compromise that allowed the bill to
pass where others had failed was over an issue that had previously
proven intractable: property exemptions. The new law provided
109. See Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or ConcessionAn Fssayon the History of CorporateLaw, 34 GA. L. REV.

873, 890 (2000).
110. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, (act jul" 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544) (repealed 1979); The
Chandler Act of 1938 (The Bankruptcy Act of 1938), Ch. X, §§ 268, 269, 270; Ch. XI, § 395, 396; Ch.
XII, §§ 520, 521,522; Ch. XIII, § 679 (repealed 1979); The Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 101el
seq. (2002).
111. DAVID A. SKEELJR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA, 73100 (2001).
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federal procedures, which implemented state 1exemption
law, a
2
day.
present
the
until
last
would
that
compromise
Noticeably absent from the 1898 Act, through the lenses of 21st
century glasses, was a provision for reorganization of corporations.
That body of law grew up spontaneously, and contemporaneously, in
the federal courts. The "equity receivership" was a process by which
large, asset-laden, economically viable but financially strapped
companies, typically railroads, restructured. "' The process began when
the management of the company and its leading creditor, often a Wall
Street investment bank, agreed to a plan which would shed the debt of
the company while preserving some, if not much, of the equity interests
of shareholders."' The bank would approach the company's various
creditors, and secure their agreement to a restructuring which would
often allow them to recover, in an orderly and reliable fashion, a portion
of their claims, but without hope of being made whole. The creditors
might even receive ownership stakes in the reorganized entity, alongside
those of the original shareholders." 5 The bank would then engage its
Wall Street attorneys to orchestrate a foreclosure sale on its behalf,
where the bank, as lead and senior creditor, or a committee of senior
creditors, would bid their debt to control the restructuring of the firm. 116
This arrangement would result in the approval of a consensual
reorganization plan, blessed with a court order.'"
This state of affairs evolved until the dawn of the New Deal. Onetime
Yale law professor and Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, William 0. Douglas made it his mission to end the
"private" equity receivership, and to bring corporate reorganizations
under the control of the federal government. Douglas distrusted big
business, and intended to end Wall Street's influence over corporate
restructurings that so deeply affected the fortunes of the economy and

112. See G. larcus Cole, The FederalistCost ofBankrupity Evemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 246

(2000).
113. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Psior y Rights, and the Conceptual
Foundationsof CorporateReorganizations, 87 VA. L. Ri. 921, 921-923 (200 1) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen,
Control Rightsj.
114. Id.
115. Id. See also N. Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) (holding that a foreclosure sale could not
result in former shareholders participating in a restructured company in which a creditor senior to
shareholders received no interest).
116. DOUGl-AS BAIRD & THOMASJACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS ON BANKRU1TCY,

961-962 (2d ed. 1990).
117.

Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note 113, at 923.
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the workers within it."' The passage of the Chandler Act in 1938
accomplished Douglas's aims."'
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code has undone much of what the Chandler
Act imposed on business bankruptcy. Among the most important
qualities to be revived was bankruptcy's temporal asset partitioning
ability. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor need not prove that it is
insolvent in order to seek relief voluntarily. 12' As a practical matter,
actual insolvency was deemed unnecessary for bankruptcy. Long before
the travails of Arthur Andersen, bankruptcy courts were well aware of
the fact that many assets and liabilities were difficult to measure or
ascertain with certainty. Valuations of "good will" and other intangible
assets were as elusive and arbitrary as the extent of potential exposure,
for example, to tort claimants holding unliquidated damage claims.
This lack ofan insolvency requirement, as will be demonstrated, permits
solvent debtors to sequester assets behind the veil cast by bankruptcy's
discharge.' 2'
IV. THE MODERN USE OF BANKRUPTCY AS LIMITED LIABILITY
DEVICE

The historical underpinnings of bankruptcy's asset partitioning
character would be interesting in and of themselves. The asset
partitioning function of bankruptcy law, however, continues to play an
important role in its present deployments. The cases presented here are
just a few illustrations of how the "common pool" paradigm distracts
attention from and facilitates the central use of bankruptcy, as asset
partition, in certain contexts. The following cases are examples, not of
collective action problems solved through bankruptcy, but rather of
assets and value sequestered by it.

118. See SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION, supra note 110, at 101-27.
119. Id. at 113-19 ("Douglas's Chandler Act stratep,.
was a smashing success in the short run.").
120. I1 U.S.C. § 301 (2002).
121. The only insolvency requirement in the Bankruptcy Code addresses the treatment ofinvoluntary
petitions. Here, Section 303 ofthe Code imposes an insolvency requirement, but a meager one at best. In
order to sustain an involuntary petition and to avoid sanctions for a wrongful one, creditors must make a
showing of the debtor's insolvency. But even this requirement is a qualified one. Section 303 merely
requires a showing of insolvency "in the cash flow sense;" a demonstration that the debtor has failed to pay
its debts when due. Even a solvent debtor, therefore, could theoretically be kept within the confines of an
involuntary petition under this rule. This is a departure from the standard under the Act, which required
a showing of insolvency "in the bankruptcy sense," that is, a demonstration that the debtor's liabilities
exceeded its assets.
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A. Mass Tort Bankruptcies
Mass tort bankruptcies form a class of cases of their own. They can
be loosely defined as cases where a manufacturer or service provider has
engaged in activity that has exposed it to a very large number of actual
or potential tort suits, and where the manufacturer or service provider
files a bankruptcy petition as a result of this exposure.122 Examples of
mass tort bankruptcy cases include those of asbestos manufacturers,
breast implant manufacturers, the A.H. Robbins "Dalkon Shield"
bankruptcy, and numerous other cases marked by environmental
hazard and products liability exposure on the part of various corporate
2
debtors. 1
Across the entire specirum of cases upon which we might attach the
label "mass tort bankruptcy," there is one characteristic common to
them all. It is not insolvency. 24 Instead, the one characteristic common
to all mass tort bankruptcy cases is the failure or inability to have a
mandatory (non-opt-out) class action certified, which would have forced
tort plaintiffs to litigate claims in unison. 23 These cases can be thought
of as "defensive bankruptcy filings" because they represent an attempt26
by mass tort defendants to reign in otherwise unmanageable litigation.'
A defensive bankruptcy filing forces all of the tort litigation into one
forum, where the defendant can marshal one set of lawyers, with a
coordinated argument, all without the collateral estoppel risks
concomitant
with litigation in each and every jurisdiction on the
27
planet.
Defendants in the mass tort setting already have the defensive asset
partitioning offered by limited liability under corporate law. Bankruptcy
provides a second defensive asset partition, protecting those assets of the
firm that exceed the claims asserted against the firm. The residual
claimants on a firm emerging from a mass tort chapter 11 can reinvest

122. See 0. Marcus Cole, A Calculus IVithout Consent: Mass Tort Bankruptcies, Future Claimants, and the
ioblem of Third Par.tyon-Debto "Discharge," 84 IOWA L. REV. 753, 755 (1999).
123. Menard-Sanford v. Niabey, (InreA.H. Robins Co. Inc.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). The
Dalkon Shield was an intrauterine contraceptive device manufactured by the debtor. Id.
124. Virtually no reasonable estimate of damages in the Dow-Corning breast implant cases would
have resulted in a circumstance where the defendant-debtor's liabilities would have exceeded its assets,
estimated to be approximately 5 billion in 1996.
125. A non-opt-out or mandatory class action, under Rule 23 ofthe Federal Code of Civil Procedure,
would require all claimants ofa particular type tojoin the class litigation, or be forever barred from asserting
a claim at a later date. FED. R. CIV. P.23(b)(I). The prerequisites for establishing a non-opt-out class action
are virtually insurmountable in the context of a mass tort case. For the standard, see Ortiz r. Fileboard Corp.,

527 U.S. 815 (1999).
126. SeeCole, A Calculus I rJthout
Consent, supla note 122, at 767.
127. Id.
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without fear that victims of the firm's previous life might reappear to
threaten their stake in the firm. Bankruptcy leaves the excess value of
the firm "exempt" from these claims, in much the same way that
English and colonial bankruptcy exempted a merchant's tools of trade.
An example of a defensive bankruptcy filing that illustrates the use of
bankruptcy as asset partition can be found in the breast implant
litigation that beleaguered manufacturers of silicone gel breast implants
in the 1990s. Dow Corning, a successful manufacturer of silicone gel
breast implants, was a joint venture subsidiary of the Dow Chemical
Company and Coming, Incorporated.'28 Dow Chemical and Coming
each owned fifty percent of the shares in Dow Coming, and each
participated, at various levels and over the course of several decades, in
the development of much of the underlying technology exploited by
their subsidiary. 2 9
Dow Coming was a cash cow, generating annual income of nearly $1
billion by the early 1990's.3 ° Suddenly, in 1991, a few women
complained of "connective tissue diseases," ailments of the ligaments
and tendons, and began to associate their illnesses with breast implants
that they had opted for years earlier.'' Once reports of lawsuits
involving silicone gel breast implants hit the news wires, Dow Coming
found itself deluged with litigation from tens of thousands of plaintiffs in
all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the
American Virgin Islands, and foreign jurisdictions including Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Japan, France,
Germany, and Italy.' 32
Despite the whirlwind of products liability litigation in which it found
itself, Dow Coming and its parents took solace in a few facts. First,
there was no or very little credible scientific evidence that their product
caused any harm to anyone.133 Second, even if the tens of thousands of
plaintiffs were successful in their efforts, the three companies estimated
Dow Corning's overall exposure at roughly $4 billion, a staggering sum
to be sure, but shy of the subsidiary's $5 billion book value. 3 4 With

128. In re Dow Coming Corp., 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002).
129. Id. at 65 1.
130.

MARCIA ANGELL, M.D, SCIENCEONTRIAL: THE CLASH OFMEDICALEVIDENCEAND THE LAW

IN THE BREAST IMPLAnNT CASE (1996).

131. Id. at 64.
132. See Kathleen Caner-Stein, Note, In Search ofJustice: Foreign Victims of Silicone Breast Implants and the
Doctrine of Fornn non Conveniens, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REX'. 167, 168 (1995).
-un"
Court-appointed Experts, Scentfically
133. Id. at 169. See also PeterJ. Goss et al., Clearing Away the
MarginalEtidence, and the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation, 36 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 227 (2001).
134. ANGELL, supra note 130, at 65.
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these considerations in hand, the parents decided to roll the dice, and
trust "the system."
The three companies chose to do battle with each and every plaintiff,
standing on both principle and science, employing gladiators from the
nation's largest law firms.3 3 And the first few rolls of the dice paid off.
The parent companies had many of the direct claims against them
dismissed. 3 6 The subsidiary won several trials that proceeded through
to jury verdicts. 3 7 The three companies' confidence in both "the
system" and their "stand your ground" strategy started to quaver a bit,
however, when a Harris County, Texas jury returned its special verdict
form. The form had asked for simple yes or no answers to each of
several questions relating to the evidence of the victim's harm, and the
responsibility of the product and each of the companies for that harm,
if any. 8 The jury found that the victim did manifest disease, but that
neither the product nor the companies were responsible for her
injuries.'39 Then, in a twist of logic that only a Harris County jury can
explain, they awarded the victim $4.1 million."4
The Harris County result caused the companies to do two things.
First, they immediately filed motions to set aside the jury award, with
intentions to appeal if they failed to prevail on these motions.' 4 ' Second,
and more importantly, it caused the companies to reassess their decision
to "dance with the devil." If a jury could be persuaded to award a
breast implant plaintiff damages upon a determination of no fault, then
it was only a matter of time before a jury would find fault in order to
award damages to a sympathetic plaintiff. Such a jury determination
would impose collateral estoppel on the companies' liability defenses in
all subsequent cases, creating a domino effect, from battle to battle, that
would eventually choke off any hopes to win the war.142 Each case,
involving each plaintiff, in every jurisdiction, had the power to control
the outcome of all other cases. The companies considered the prospects
of making their case simultaneously in severaljurisdictions, and they did
not like them. To have the best chance, they had to get the cases
aggregated in one forum.

135. Id.
136. Jean Hellwegej Plaintisff &ore Vctories in Breast Implant Cases, TRIAL 16 (March 1999).
137. Krista R. Stine, Silicone, Science and Settlements: Breast Implants and a Searchfor Tith, 63 DEF. COUNS.
J. 491 (1996).
138. Laas %.Dow Chem. Corp., No. 93-04266 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 1995).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. ANGELL, supra note 130, at 63.
142. Id.
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Aggregating the claims would not be easy. Each plaintiff had the
implant surgery under factual circumstances that would preclude
voluntary class action, let alone a non-opt-out one. 43 For cases that
qualified for diversity jurisdiction, the companies had a plan that proved
somewhat successful. Theyhad the cases removed from state to federal
court, and then persuaded the federal courts involved to transfer venue
to the multi-district litigation forum presided over by judge Sam Pointer
of the Northern District of Alabama.' 44 This aggregation of claims in
one federal forum reduced the strain of the companies' legal resources,
but left other cases, which were not removed, dangling in far-flung state
courts. When the negotiations presided over by judge Pointer reached
an impasse, the three companies resorted to a strategy
that proved very
143
successful: Dow Coming filed for bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy fiding in the Eastern District of Michigan solved
virtually all of the problems confronted by the three co-defendant
companies. First, it halted all litigation against the subsidiary, and
aggregated all claims in one forum, to be addressed by one team of the
finest lawyers the companies could assemble. Second, it provided an
opportunity for the parent companies to seek the protection of Dow
Corning's bankruptcy proceeding, through an extension of the
automatic stay to their own, related litigation. 146 Third, and most
importantly for our discussion here, Dow Corning's bankruptcy filing
provided the three companies with a mechanism to fix and cut off all
present and future claims in order to preserve the excess value of all
three defendant corporations. In other words, Dow Corning's
bankruptcy allowed the companies to partition assets.
The parent companies, with market capitalizations of $26 billion and
$18 billion respectively, were never in danger of insolvency from the
breast implant litigation. 14' Their share value did suffer, however, from
the uncertainty of undiscovered future claims. In order to remove this
uncertainty, the companies sought their own asset partitioning through
a third party non-debtor "discharge.'

, 4
, '

A third party non-debtor

143. Rule 23 requires a commonality of claims, including factual circumstances, in order to certify a
class action. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 23(b).
144. Judge Sam Pointer is the author of MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION (1991). See Breast Implants:
Dow Chemical Can't Certi 1995 Ruling to 6th Cir. ForAppeal in re Dow Coming Corp., 9 ANDREWS IED. DEVICES
LITIG. REP. 4 (2002).
145. Thomas NI. Burton, Dow CorningMoves to Qi Chapter 11 -Plan for S3 Billion
Includes Big Tia but
Creditors May Have Other Ideas, WALL ST.J., December 3, 1996, at A3.
146. Judge Denies Motion To Stop Implant Suits On Dow Chemical Co., WALL ST.J.,June 9, 1995, at B I2.
147. George Gunset, Bankiptgy FilingMay Stall Implant Suits, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1995, at I; see also
Sandra Chereb, judge Reects Dow Chemical Request on Award, LAS VEGAS REv.J., February 10, 1996, at lB.
148. Cole, A Calculus WVithout Consent, supra note 122, at 755.
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discharge is a section 105(a) injunction on behalf of the third party,
issued by the bankruptcy court, protecting the third party from liability
arising from claims related to its association with the debtor.'49 Such
injunctions are typically awarded in exchange for a contribution of some
type to the debtor's reorganization, and as a result, are rarely objected
to, since the only affected parties present are getting more out of the
deal than they would realize without it. 50 In other words, third parties

can use a related debtor's bankruptcy proceeding to "buy" protection,
and asset partitioning, from future claims without being insolvent or
filing for bankruptcy themselves.s'
Although the parent companies were not entirely successful in
obtaining their own asset partition, their subsidiary, Dow Coming, was.
As noted earlier, Dow Corning was solvent when it filed its defensive,
voluntary bankruptcy petition. Through bankruptcy, it arrived at a cap
on its breast implant liability, and provided for a claims resolution
facility to distribute damage awards from a trust to be funded by
company profits for a period of ten years. 132 In short, residual
ownership of this very profitable company was transferred to tort victims
for a specified period of time, after which it will revert to the parent
companies. The parent companies merely lent the goose that laid the
golden eggs. Bankruptcy prevented the killing of it.
Although it may serve as an extreme example, Dow Corning's
chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding is not extraordinary. To the
contrary, the capping and disposition of tort claims through chapter 11
has become de rigueur for solvent companies facing unmanageable mass
tort exposure and litigation. 53 Bankruptcy's discharge, unhinged from
any insolvency requirement, has provided many solvent companies with
a way to partition assets.
B. "Ring-Fencing"
"Ring-fencing," as an explicit bankruptcy strategy, is associated with
only one, but very prominent and controversial case: the chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings of the Pacific Gas & Electric Company of
California. 54 Ring-fencing, according to the lawyers who asserted this
strategy, is the practice of filing a bankruptcy petition on behalf of a

149.
130.
151.
152.
133.
154.

Id. at 759-60.
Id. at 792-95.
Id.
In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).
Cole, A Calculus IVithout Consent, supra note 122, at 755.

In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 271 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
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subsidiary of a corporate parent company, while preserving the integrity
of the parent and siblings of the debtor, as well as any distributions that
may have been made to those affiliates. 133 Ring fencing allows for the
restructuring of the subsidiary through chapter 11, even if the earnings
of that subsidiary, had they been retained and not distributed to the
parent-shareholder, would have been sufficient,
theoretically, to satisfy
6
the claims against the subsidiary in full. 13

The etymology of the term is an odd story in itself. It appears to be
derived from a requirement imposed upon large private utility
companies in various markets around the world. In Australia, for
example, 13an
electric utility is forbidden from operating in two
"regions." 7 Australian law provides for an exception to this general
prohibition, however, if a parent company owns two "independent"
subsidiaries that operate in different regions. The regulations
specifically require the parent company to "ring-fence" the operations
of one subsidiary from any other, such that each operates as though they
were completely unrelated entities. 138 The object of the ring-fencing
requirement ostensibly is to deny large companies the opportunity, to
engage in predatory pricing to undercut and displace smaller
competitors. 151

PG&E's lawyers turned this regulatory requirement into a strategy in
their chapter I I proceeding. The two principal concerns for the PG&E
legal team were the large shareholder distributions made shortly before
the bankruptcy petition was filed, and executive bonuses paid to parent
and subsidiary marfagers within the same time frame. 6 ' Each of these
distributions of cash were met by alarm in the press, and among the

155. SeeCalifomnia Pacific Gas & Electric's Move to Isolate Assets Raises Controversy, SANJOSE MERCURY
NEWS, August 28, 2001 ("At its simplest, you can think of PG&E as a modem-day kingdom with two big
subdivisions. One is the regulated utility, Pacific Gas & Electric, which sells electricity and natural gas to
millions of Californians and owns a vast network of hydroelectric facilities and land across northern
California. While traditionally very profitable, the utility lost S3.48 billion last year. The other, a gated
community, holds the non-regulated National Energy Group. National Energy Group owns most ofthe rest
of what constitutes PG&E Corp., including 612 miles of gas pipelines, more than 30 power plants and energy
trading operations. National Energy Group made S162 million in profit last year. It's this segment that
executives "ring-fenced"'/4the legal jargon for isolating a subsidiary from other companies in the same
corporate fiefdom.").
156. Id.
137. See Office of the Regulator-General, State of Victoria, Australia, Issue Paper Ring-Fencing in the
Electricity and Gas Industries, (July 2000) (on
file with author);
see also
http://wwws%.reggen.vic.gov.au/elec 27j.htm (last isited May 16, 2002).

158. Office of the Regulator-General, supra'note 157, at 12.
159. Id. at 3.
160. Jennifer jorhus, PG&E Corp. Gare Top Executives S18 Million in Bonuses in 2001, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, (March 14, 2002) ("PG&E handed out S18 million in bonuses to its top executives last
year-the year its electric utility filed for bankruptcy protection.").
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various groups representing California consumers concerned about
electricity supply and the prices they were to going to have to pay for
it.16 1 PG&E's management and lawyers anticipated, no doubt, the
uproar these distributions might cause. They made them nevertheless,
confident that in the end, they would rest safely behind the protection
afforded by bankruptcy's asset partition.
PG&E's road to the shelter of chapter 11 bankruptcy began
innocently enough. In 1995, California enacted sweeping legislative
reforms that purported to "deregulate" electricity markets across the
state. 62 In truth, what the legislature accomplished, with the assistance
and approval of short-sighted electric utility providers, was to create
what hindsight has proven to be an unstable regulatory regime. First,
the legislation required conglomerates like PG&E to divest their energy
production capacity. This requirement grew out of the belief that
deregulation would permit retailers with production capacity to
manipulate supply, thereby creating shortages that would cause prices
to spike.' 63 They could retain any assets required to transmit electricity
from suppliers to consumers, but little else.' 64 Second, retailers, newly
stripped of their production capabilities, were permitted to sell to
consumers and businesses, at retail prices that were capped by the
statute, electricity they purchased at spot prices on the wholesale
production grid. 63 These price caps were set to expire after sunk costs
were recovered.'66 Third, and importantly, retailers like PG&E were
forbidden from purchasing their electricity through long-term contracts,
which would have allowed them to hedge against price fluctuations.' 67
This third requirement was designed to prevent retailers from capturing
a windfall that they need not pass along to consumers. Instead, retailers

161. California Offcials Sue PG&E-Claim Utility Funded Affiliates, Nxr. GAS WK.,January 14, 2002, at
P3 ("The lawsuit also claims that PG&E created new entities to 'ring-fence' its unregulated assets in order
to protect them during the utility's bankruptcy. Allegedly, the parent company also collected $278 million
in income taxes from the utility that wvasn't paid to the state.").
162. Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 367-376 (2002).
163. Peter Fox-Penner & Greg Basheda, A Short Honeymoon for Utiliy Deregulation, ISSUES Sci. &
TECH.5156 (2001).
164. Id. See also Charles F. Bostwick, Utilities,,ved '95 Bid to Add.,ew Plants.-PurchasingPower Elsewhere
Cheaper, SAN DIEGO UNION &TRIB.,January 21, 2001, at A3.
165. Editorial, .N\oBetter Option. Davis' Plan to Ease the Power Crisis I Von't Really Please Anyone, but It's the
FairestOne.,Vow on the Table, L.A. T.\IES, February 19, 2001, at B6 ("The freeze on rates-designed to make
deregulation politically palpable-is a major reason that the utilities have gone as much as S12 billion in
debt.").
166. Michael McGrath,Another Perspective. California'sShadow, 26 ELEC. PERSP. 64 (2001).
167. Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 367-376 (2002). See also Peter list, CaliforniaPower Contagion, 13 GLOBAL

FIN. 6568, (2001).
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were required to source their wholesale electricity supply from spot
markets.168
Retailers, including PG&E, helped craft the legislation, and
applauded its passage. 161 While they were not enamored of the retail
price caps, they saw these as set high enough to allow profitability.
They had greater uneasiness about the divestiture of productive
capacity, but were able to reconcile this defeat as a cost of progress on
other fronts. With these two arms, production and hedging, tied behind
its back, PG&E skipped down the road to what it thought was a freer
and more rational future.
Rationality gave way to rationing, however, when the natural gas
supply in the northwest shrank below critical levels in late 1999. Over
two thirds of California's electricity was supplied by "clean burning"
natural gas generating stations, and the drop in gas supply brought with
it spikes in natural gas prices, and of course, in wholesale electricity
prices.7 As these wholesale prices skyrocketed during the autumn of
2000 and the winter of 2001, PG&E, like other retailers, found itself
often purchasing electricity at prices approaching $0.30 per
kilowatt/hour, ten times the three cent price cap imposed upon the
prices at which it could sell to end users of electricity."'
By March of 2000, two things were clear: PG&E could not continue
to purchase energy for far more than it could sell it, and the State of
California could not force out-of-state electricity producers to supply
energy with no prospect of being paid. The State of California did,
however, agree to guarantee payment on behalf of PG&E, whose credit
rating had fallen to junk bond Status and below, and had no prospect of
borrowing funds needed to purchase electricity wholesale."' When
PG&E finally succumbed to the market realities, it filed a chapter 11
petition in the Northern District of California on April 5, 2001, making

168. Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§367.376 (2002). See also Robin Fields, The California Energy Cyisis Trading
FloorBreathing Last Gasps in Failureof Deregulation, L.A. TIME,January 29, 2001, at Al.
169. Nancy Vogel, Enron tision Proved Costv to Firm, State Energy: Wild Promises of the Savings From
DeregulationHelpedBring it About. In the End the State Paid Heavily For.\'\ w Syst m,and Enron IVas Left a Small Player,
L.A. TI.\ES, January 28, 2002, at B I.
170. Stephanie Anderson Forest, with Christopher Palmeri, 7hliang Under Suspicon, BUS. WEEK,
August 6, 2001, at 72; John Elin, There's.,Vo.eed to Freeze in the Dark, 17 INSIGHT MAG. 22 (March 12, 2001).
171. TEs\IONY OF THE HONORABLE JUDY MART-Z GOVERNOR OF MONT.ANA BEFORE THE
CoMMrrrEEON GOVERNMENTALAFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE, Wednesday,June 20, 2001, 2001 WL

21756253 ("State rules barred California utilities from recovering wholesale power costs from retail rates,
forcing utilities to buy power at 30 cents per kilowatt-hour and resell it for 3 cents. It was those rulesimposed by the State ofCalifornia-that destroyed the financial health ofthe utilities and drove Pacific Gas
& Electric (PG&E) into bankruptcy.").

172. Tim Reiterman &Jerry Hirsch, The State Rate Hike IrVdl Cover Power Costs, State Says, L.A. TIMES,
July 23, 2001, at Al.
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it only the third utility to resort to bankruptcy since the Great
Depression.
If PG&E's bankruptcy filing was alarming, the news of its prebankruptcy maneuvers created an uproar. Soon after the bankruptcy
filing, business reporters discovered that PG&E had paid close to $13
billion in dividends to its sole shareholder and parent company, the
Pacific Gas& Electric Holdings Company, Inc., over the course of the
several months leading up to the filing; but while the subsidiary was still
solvent. What made the revelation all the more disturbing was the fact
that the debtor-subsidiary had outstanding obligations to the State of
California and electricity wholesalers estimated at approximately $12
billion. 7"'4 PG&E added insult to injury, in the eyes of consumer groups,
when it submitted a request to the bankruptcy court for the payment of
retention bonuses for corporate officers, duplicating payments
that had
5
7
1
company.
parent
the
of
officers
the
to
made
been
already
Consumer groups and State officials, outraged by the revelations of
bankruptcy eve distributions, clamored for equitable action by Judge
Dennis Montali to right these apparent wrongs. PG&E's counsel calmly
asserted their arguments, and prevailed upon Judge Montali to ignore
the politics and follow the law. First, PG&E demonstrated that while the
shareholder distributions were large, they did not leave the company
unreasonably undercapitalized at the time, and were therefore beyond
the reach of fraudulent conveyance actions.' 76 Second, it argued that
the bonuses, both pre-petition to parent company managers, and postpetition to the debtor-utility's senior executives, were a necessary and
commonplace method for retaining management expertise in a period
of uncertainty."'
The biggest concern for PG&E's lawyers was whether the "ringfence" would hold. A substantive consolidation motion, in search of the

173. Howard Mintz, San Francisco Judge to Make Big Decisions in PG&E's Bankruptcy Case, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Saturday, April 7,2001. Prior to the PG&E filing, only El Paso Electric Co. in Texas and
the Public Service Co. of New Hampshire have chosen to go the same route as PG&E, filing bankruptcy to
cope with insolvency and an inability to reach deals with state regulators and politicians. Both of those
utilities turned to bankruptcy court because they built nuclear power plants that were too costly, and
emerged from chapter II after years of litigation and tens of millions of dollars in bankruptcy-related costs.
Id.
174. State Sues PG&E/Parent Firn Shfted Billions ofDollars Illegally, Attorney GeneralCharge, S.F. CHRON.,
January 10, 2002, at Al ("PG&E Corp. created new holding companies in 'aring-fencing move to prevent
assets from being diverted for possible creditor claims if the utility filed for bankruptcy,' the attorney general
said. The complaint also said the holding company funneled cash from PG&E through tax payments that
exceeded the utility's actual share of liabilities.").
173. Jennifer Bjorhus, PG&E Coip. Gave Top Executives S18 Million in Bonuses in 2001, SAN JOSE
IERCURY NEWS, (March 14, 2002).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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assets of the parent-shareholder, as well as sister company holdings and
78
production capacity, was held in abeyance by thin corporate veils.
But the veils have held, and the distributions of assets will be forever free
from the claims arising out of the electricity crisis of 2001, thanks to a
chapter 11 discharge, acting as temporal asset partition.
C. '_7urisdiction-JumpingDeadbeats"
Corporate debtors are not alone in their enjoyment of bankruptcy
79
law's asset partitioning. The phrase 'jurisdiction-jumping deadbeats"1
refers to a phenomenon at the heart of bankruptcy exemption reform.
It is a controversial, but straightforward phenomenon. A debtor with
extensive assets and comparably extensive debts, changes her state of
residence on the eve of bankruptcy. She converts her assets into
property that the new state exempts from creditor levy, and then files a
petition for bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 8 °
The bankruptcy filing will stay any collection activities on the part of her
creditors'
It will also result in the division of any remaining,
nonexempt assets among her creditors on a pro rata basis, and the
discharge of any further obligation on her pre-petition debts.
What makes jurisdiction jumping both possible and attractive is the
conjunction of two facts: states vary dramatically as to the types and
extent of the property they deem exempt from creditor levy, and federal
bankruptcy law incorporates those disparate state exemption schemes.
Anecdotes ofjurisdiction-jumping deadbeats abound. Familiar stories
and names include actor Burt Reynolds, and former Commissioner of
Major League Baseball, Bowie Kuhn.'82 These anecdotes have
overshadowed all debate over property exemptions in bankruptcy, and
have driven recent reform efforts. Both the House of Representatives,
as well as the Senate have passed bills circumscribing the operation of
state homestead and property exemption laws, capping them, effectively
for the first time, for debtors in the five states where they had been
unlimited for as long as two hundred years. 83
' President Clinton vetoed

178. Scott Herhold, Stocks Comment Column: Bottoms up to Pg&e,the Parentand Utiliy, SANJOSE MERCURY
NEWs, April 16, 2001.
179. See Cole, The Fedealist Cost ofBankmpty Evemption Refoim, supra note 112, at 229.
180. Although this discussion focuses on chapter 7, a consumer debtor might employ jurisdiction
jumping in chapter 13, and if the deadbeat debtor is a professional with business debts, the process explained
here can be accomplished, in a much more complicated fashion, through chapter 11.
181. See II U.S.C. § 362 (2002).
182. SKEEL, supianote 111, at 41.
183. Greg Hitt, Bankiptcy-Overhaul Bill .Vears Passage: Stringency, ot loigiveness, Distinguishes Measue
Backed by Financial-Sewviceslndustiy, W\LL ST.J., May 8, 2002, at A4.
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reform measures presented late in his administration, and President
Bush is being lobbied by many within his home state of Texas to do the
same with the current efforts. Until reform actually takes hold,
jurisdiction-jumping by well-heeled deadbeats will continue as a classic
case of bankruptcy as asset partition.
The asset partitioning that occurs in the case ofjurisdiction-jumping
is very akin to the original role played by bankruptcy in its early English
and colonial American manifestations. Well-heeled citizens often
become well-heeled through extraordinary productivity and human
capital. They are often professionals: lawyers, doctors, dentists, and
engineers. They typically continue to engage in productive work after
reaching the sanctuary of the target exemption regime.1 4 They are, in
a very real sense, like the sole proprietors that early bankruptcy law
identified as "merchants or traders." When they flee to, a new
jurisdiction in search of more generous property exemptions, they are
employing the limited liability function of bankruptcy to sequester more
assets from their creditors than might otherwise be possible. In other
words, they are partitioning-off more assets.
States afford "more" limited liability through their exemption regimes
for a multitude of reasons. One study has demonstrated that states with
unlimited homestead exemptions have lower mortgage interest rates,
and a concomitant higher rate of home ownership.8 This result stands
to reason, because debtors confronted with a choice of creditors to pay
with nonexempt assets, like cash, are likely to pay creditors holding
security (a mortgage) in exempt assets first."8 6 This preference makes
mortgage lending in states like Florida and Texas safer than in other
states, and this reduction in risk is reflected in interest rates.' 87 The fiscal
and social policy reflected in a state's choice of exemption levels takes
effect when combined with bankruptcy's defensive asset partition.
D. "Scotchgarding": Not 'JudgmentProof"Just 'Judgment Resistant"
The use of bankruptcy as an asset partition is not limited to
circumstances involving many claims on a debtors assets. Sometimes,
just one claim can give rise to the employment of bankruptcy's limited
liability qualities, and the nuisance involved in its invocation. Such a
use of bankruptcy can be thought of as "Scotchgarding," to coin a

184. See Margaret F. Brinig & F. H. Buckley, The Ma fetfir Deadbeats, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1996).
185. Jeremy Berkowitz & Richard Hynes, Bank-upky Evemptions and the Market for MortgageLoans, 42J.
LAW & Ecox. 809, 826 (1999).
186. id.
187. Cole, The Federalist Cost o'Bankruptcy Evemption Rtfbrm, supra note 112, at 254.
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phrase, because it does not render a debtor or its assets "judgment
proof," merely "judgment resistant." Bankruptcy, in such instances,
becomes a bargaining device, meant to deprive claimants of the full
value of their claims, precisely because of the time and expense required
to see the bankruptcy process through to its threatened discharge.
The most colorful example of Scotchguarding can be found in the
1987 bankruptcy filing of Texaco, Inc. At the time of its bankruptcy
petition, Texaco was nowhere in the vicinity of insolvency, having a net
worth of approximately $25 billion. "' The filing was merely one move
in a series of strategic plays in a multibillion dollar legal battle. Texaco's
bankruptcy was a move to thwart Pennzoil. The facts are worth
revisiting.
In late 1983, Pennzoil had followed, with great interest, the dissension
within the board of Getty Oil, a reserve-rich producer and retailer.8 9
Gordon Getty, a director and owner, as trustee of the Sarah C. Getty
Trust, owned approximately forty percent of the company, and was
dissatisfied with the company's performance and direction.' 9° Pennzoil
saw Getty's troubles as an opportunity. In late December, 1983,
Pennzoil's board and management announced an unsolicited tender
offer for 16 million shares of Getty Oil at $100 each.' 9'
Shortly after this announcement, Pennzoil contacted both Gordon
Getty, and the Getty Museum in Los Angeles, which held another
twelve percent of the company.'92 After a few days of negotiating, the
parties drafted a "Memorandum Agreement" under which Pennzoil
would obtain three-sevenths of Getty Oil, and the Trust would own
four-sevenths of the company.' 93 Under this agreement, Gordon Getty
would become chairman of the new company, andJ. Hugh Liedtke,
Pennzoil's chief executive officer, would become chief executive officer
of the new company. 94
The Memorandum Agreement further provided that Pennzoil would
pay $110 per share for the 12% held by the museum, and all other
outstanding public shares. '13 Pennzoil would then have the option to
purchase 8 million more shares to achieve its desired percentage of the
company. The agreement also provided that Pennzoil and the Trust
would try, in good faith, to restructure Getty Oil within a year, but
SKEEL, supra note I 1I, at I.
189. THOMAS PETZINGERJR., OIL AND HONOR: THE TFXACO-PENNZOIL WARS, 251-262 (1987).
190. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987).
188.

191.

Id. at 785.

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
193. Id.
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failing that, the assets of Getty were to be divided between them, with
three-sevenths going to Pennzoil, and four-sevenths going to the Trust.
The agreement stipulated that it would expire if not ratified by the Getty
board at its meeting onJanuary 2, 1984.196
Although Getty's board was resistant at first, it agreed to Pennzoil's
overture, but only on the condition that the $110 price be sweetened
with a five dollar "stub," a distribution resulting from the sale of a
subsidiary, and payable over five years. Pennzoil agreed to this
modification of their deal over the telephone, and announced the
merger to the world the next morning.' 97
Despite the pending and eventual agreement with Pennzoil, Getty
managers were busy soliciting competing bids during its board
deliberations. When Texaco learned of Pennzoil's interest in Getty, it
quickly assembled an in house financial team to evaluate the target
company. Within one day, Texaco had determined that it would make
a play for Getty. On January 5, 1984, when Getty lawyers were
supposed to be in a meeting drafting the final documents of the contract
with Pennzoil, they met instead with Texaco representatives, who
offered $125 per share.198 When the Getty board learned of the Texaco
offer, it immediately and unanimously voted to withdraw its acceptance
of the Pennzoil bid, and to accept the Texaco proposal.' 99
Texaco's strategy was implemented flawlessly. First, it contacted the
lawyer for the museum, and secured an agreement to purchase its shares
at the higher price. Then it took evidence of the purchase to Gordon
Getty, who Texaco knew was frightened of being left holding a minority
interest in the company, worthless "paper."2 ° Texaco's chairman,
Howard McKinley, then secured Gordon Getty's agreement, and
20
presented it to the board along with its intent to own 100% of Getty.

1

Pennzoil management was angry at what it saw as a much larger
company using its considerable resources to scuttle its contract.
Pennzoil tried to stop the Texaco-Getty merger by seeking a temporary
injunction against those two companies in the Delaware Chancery
Court. In rejecting Pennzoil's request, Vice Chancellor Brown
suggested that he thought the facts demonstrated that Pennzoil had a

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
PETZINGER, supra note 189, at 272.
Id. at 251.
Texaco v. Penzoil, 729 S.W.2d at 774.
PETZINGER, supra note 189, at 257-58.
Id. at 259.
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contract with Getty, but that its remedy at law, money damages, was
adequate. 0 2
Pennzoil managers were deeply disappointed by the ruling, but
heartened by the opinion. Their principal concern was that litigation
in Delaware would advantage Texaco, a New York corporation with
considerably greater resources than Texas-based Pennzoil. Pennzoil
remedied this disadvantage, however, by taking advantage of a littleknown rule of Delaware procedure. A plaintiff, it seems, could non-suit
a defendant, without leave from the court, at any time up until the
defendant files an answer.20 3 All of the defendants, including Getty Oil,
the museum, and the lawyer-defendants had filed answers. All of the
defendants, that is, except for Texaco. Pennzoil used this fact to nonsuit Texaco, and file a new lawsuit, fifteen minutes later, in the Harris
20 4
County Courthouse in its hometown of Houston.
Texaco paid dearly for its procedural oversight. The Harris County
jury returned a verdict of $7.53 billion against it in damages for tortious
interference with a contract.2 The jury also slapped Texaco with a $3
billion punitive damage award, finding Texaco's actions to be
malicious. 2 6 An appeals court ordered remittance of $2 billion, leaving
Texaco saddled with ajudgment against it for $8.53 billion, the largest
damage award in the history of the world at the time.20 7
Although an $8 billion award would gut most companies, Texaco was
never in danger of insolvency. Its $25 billion net worth would suffer a
serious dent, but the company could survive the hit. Texaco was not
about to let Pennzoil have the last laugh, however. Texaco would do
anything it could in order to undermine Pennzoil's victory, and the one
thing it could do, as a solvent company, was file for bankruptcy. In the
end, Pennzoil's collection efforts were frustrated, not by insolvency, but
by bankruptcy and the long, expensive road to its asset partitioning
discharge. Pennzoil was forced to negotiate, settling for a more modest
payout of $4.3 billion.208 Bankruptcy did not make Texaco judgmentproof, as might be accomplished, theoretically, through organizational
law. Instead, bankruptcy made a solvent Texaco judgment-resistant.
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E. Retail Real Estate Lease Rejection
The fifth, and by far the most frequent, example of bankruptcy's use
as a limited liability device can be found in cases involving the chapter
11 reorganizations of retailers. Retailers file bankruptcy petitions like
no other category of business. °9 In fact, retailer bankruptcies are so
common that it is quite appropriate to assert that bankruptcy is part of
the retail business. It is perhaps from the frequency with which retailers
file bankruptcy petitions that we stand to learn the most about
bankruptcy as a limited liability device.
The reasons for the frequency of retailer bankruptcy are obvious to
those familiar with either bankruptcy law or the retail industry. A
retailer's business is, for the most part, its location. Sure, it matters what
the retailer is selling, but what the retailer is selling depends, in the end,
on whether someone nearby is selling the same thing. Even Starbuck's
Coffee has a limit to its proliferation: we are unlikely to see Starbuck's
outlets next door to each other. Location, location, location is the
fundamental principal of retailing, and all of those locations are, for the
most part, leased.
Leasing locations rather than owning them allows a retailer the ability
to gauge the cost of goods soldas a function of the cost of putting those
goods on display. Margins on certain types of goods, say coffee, may be
large enough justify a lease on the ground floor of a downtown office
tower, while margins on another good, say produce, may not be so
large. Leases also grant retailers the flexibility to cease offering their
wares for sale when real estate becomes too pricey. Even the fact that
a real estate lease is a fee for a term of years does not deprive retailers
of this flexibility, because the source of the flexibility is the Bankruptcy
Code itself.
Under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-in-possession in
a chapter 11 case, exercising the powers of the trustee, can assume,
assign, or reject executory contracts to which the debtor is a party,
including unexpired leases where the debtor is the lessee.210 Rejection
of a contract or lease is treated, for the most part, as a pre-petition
breach of contract, resulting in a pre-petition, unsecured bankruptcy
claim for the victim of the breach."
Where a debtor is insolvent,
damages for breach of contract are reduced to the victim's pro rata

209. Dean Starkman, Repo Men qfRetailing--'Space Liquidatois' Unload Real Estate Left Behind l1Ihen Big
Chains Go Bust, WALL ST.J., Nov. 28, 2001, at BI.
210. See II U.S.C.§365(2002).
211. Id.
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share of its bankruptcy claim." 2 Since breach of contract in bankruptcy
generally bears only a fraction of the costs of breach outside of
bankruptcy, breach of contract becomes a more attractive alternative in
bankruptcy. But note that this result is true only for the insolvent
debtor; a solvent debtor in bankruptcy will have to pay full damages for
breach of contract. This is true unless the victim of the breach is a
landlord and the contract to be breached is a commercial real estate
lease.
For landlords, the Bankruptcy Code has its own special form of
torture, namely, section 502(b)(6).213 This provision disallows any claims
asserted by a landlord from the breach of a lease to the extent that the
claim exceeds "the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for
the greater of one year, or fifteen percent, not to exceed three years, of
the remaining term of such lease ....

Section 502(b)(6), in other

words, places a cap on a landlord's claim. That cap may be calculated,
according to section 502(b)(6), as follows: A landlord can get a claim
equivalent to up to one year's rent if the lease has less than 6.7 years
remaining; fifteen percent of all remaining rent payments if the lease
term has between 6.7 and 20 years remaining; and a total of three
years' rent if the lease term has more than 20 years left on it. A long
term lease under the Bankruptcy Code, then, is merely a free option on
the value of the underlying real estate for the benefit of the tenant. If
the value increases, the tenant keeps the lease; if the value decreases,
the tenant files for bankruptcy and rejects the lease, paying reduced
damages under the section 502(b)(6) formula.
Retailers know and use section 502(b)(6). They also know that they
need not be insolvent to take advantage of the reduced damages for

212. Id.
213. Section 502 provides, in relevantpart, that:
(b) [TJhe court.., shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United
States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount,
except to the extent that(6)

if such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the termination of a
lease of real property, such claim exceeds(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the greater of one year,
or 1 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of such lease,

following the earlier of(i) the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) the date on which the lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, the leased
property; plus
(B)
any unpaid rent due under such lease, without acceleration, on the earlier ofsuch
dates ....
I I U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (2002).
214. Id.
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breach provided under it. As a result, retailers frequently visit the
question as to which of their locations are unprofitable, and nearly as
frequently resort to chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code to shed the leases
to those unprofitable sites. Many do so without regard to the solvency
of the firm overall.
As you might suspect, long term commercial real estate leases, by and
large, do not exist. They do not exist, by and large, because both
landlords and their potential tenants know the treatment they receive
under the bankruptcy code.2 13 Instead, most commercial real estate
leases, in tight real estate markets, tend to be drawn for five year terms
or less. A five year term permits a commercial landlord the ability to
target a one year damages claim in the event of a tenant bankruptcy
filing. It also affords the landlord nearly all the downside market
protection it can get in the shadow of section 502(b)(6). As one might
also suspect, security deposits on commercial real estate closely tracks
the one year damage expectation.1 6
The market adjustments made by retailers and their landlords to the
damages cap afforded by the bankruptcy code reveals a great deal about
the use of bankruptcy as a limited liability device. In the case of
commercial real estate lease rejection, solvent debtors can visit
bankruptcy frequently to limit liability to their largest creditors, and
knowing this, these creditors can price commercial space accordingly.
In short, the use of bankruptcy as a limited liability device can function
as a normal and expected backdrop against which debtors and creditors
bargain.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITING LIABILITY THOUGH BANKRUPTCY

Bankruptcy's use as a limited liability device is interesting in and of
itself. The controversial cases enabled by this device might be remedied,
theoretically, by either requiring insolvency for the invocation of
bankruptcy's procedures or the elimination or discretionary application
of the discharge in cases later determined to be those involving solvent
debtors. While such a fix might eliminate the troublesome cases, such
a proposal is not the object of this Article. Instead, the interesting thing
about bankruptcy's use as an asset partition is not the controversial cases
that it produces, but rather, the things it tells us about the nature of
bankruptcy itself. These implications of bankruptcy as temporal asset

2 15. Marcus Cole, Inftmal Guatantees in Venture Capital Finance: The Case ofSilicon VaAly Commercial Real
Estate [forthcoming, draft on file with author].
216. ld.at I.
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partition are, principally, three. First, it suggests that perhaps corporate
reorganization is not, in the purest sense, bankruptcy law, and should
instead be considered a matter of state insolvency law, contract law, and
equity. Second, it suggests that while corporate debtors are not
necessarily in need of the additional defensive asset partitioning
provided by bankruptcy, partnerships and sole proprietorships always
have such a need. These forms of business organization also share a
special need for the affirmative asset partitioning provided by secured
credit. Third and finally, bankruptcy's function as an asset partition
suggests that it is often superfluous, performing functions, particularly
in the commercial context, that can be better served by organizational
and contract law, as well as the principles of equity. Each of these three
implications is explored in turn.
A. FederalBankruptcy Law Versus State Insolveny and Contract Law
In their recent article, The End ofBankruptcy, Professors Douglas Baird
and Robert Rasmussen assert that corporate debtors and their creditors
have developed sophisticated private contractual solutions to issues of
reorganization that have caused them to have a decreasing reliance on
the federal bankruptcy mechanism.2 17 Baird and Rasmussen point to
the growth of non-bankruptcy workouts and prepackaged bankruptcy
reorganization plans, as evidence of this sophistication.21 They also
suggest that when creditors acquiesce to the bankruptcy process, they do
so to consolidate and exercise their control rights.' 9 Part of the reason
for the flight from the bankruptcy system is the discovery of alternative
means by which bankruptcy's principle function, the reduction of the
cost of credit, might be accomplished. Corporate debtors and their
creditors achieve this overarching purpose through consensual,
contractual mechanisms, operating under state law, which need not pay
obeisance to artificial mechanical standards like the "absolute priority
rule. 220 Baird and Rasmussen view these developments as signaling the
end of corporate bankruptcy.22 '
A vision of bankruptcy as asset partition is consistent with, and
supports the Baird-Rasmussen thesis. But it goes further. Corporate
debtors and their creditors can often anticipate and negotiate workouts

217. Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note II, at 12. See also Baird & Rasmussen, Control
Rights, supra note 113, at 923.

218. Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note 113, at 923.
219. Id.
220. Baird & Rasmussen, The End ofBankruptcy, supra note II, at 13.
221. Id.
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that can meet their particular needs far better than a one-size-fits-all
bankruptcy system. They can also employ organizational law to their
greatest advantage, achieving as many effective asset partitions as they
desire. In fact, according to one leading critic of consensual corporate
manipulations of organizational law and consensual contractual
bankruptcy, corporate and bankruptcy law have
given corporate debtors
222
the ability to acquire "judgment proofing.
If both corporate law and bankruptcy law provide asset partitioning,
are they redundant? Could corporate debtors and their creditors
achieve the results they desire in the absence of bankruptcy? Or does
bankruptcy offer something more that is unavailable under state
corporation and contract law?
The answer to these questions depends upon the content of
bankruptcy law. The devil is in the details. As noted earlier, the
temporal asset partitioning effect ofbankruptcy requires two conditions.
First, an asset partitioning bankruptcy regime requires an absence of an
insolvency requirement. To sequester surplus value, there must be
surplus value. Second, and equally important, an asset-partitioning
bankruptcy regime must offer priorities that deviate from those found
under state law. If we had a law of corporate reorganization that
religiously and faithfully adhered to the absolute priority rule, there
would be no asset partitioning at all. In essence, the absolute priority
rule requires that the nonbankruptcy priority of claims be preserved
within bankruptcy.2 ' This rule insists that each claim be satisfied in full
before any claim junior to it receives any share of the debtor's assets.224
In order for asset partitioning to occur under a bankruptcy regime,
some past creditor must receive less than all to which it is entitled from
an ultimately solvent debtor, one whose pre-bankruptcy owners retain
an interest in the firm. Bankruptcy's discharge ensures that a past
creditor so treated will never return for full satisfaction. Future
claimants of a mass tortfeasor, for example, must resort to the
designated claims resolution trust, even if the restructured tortfeasor
proves wildly successful upon its emergence from chapter 11. Similarly,
an electric utility with an understanding of simple arithmetic that
enables it to foresee a future of insolvency made imminent by its
regulatory environment need have no fear that disappointed creditors

222. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failureof PublicCompany Banknsptciesin Delawate and.Vew
fork Empirical Etidence
ofa "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND. L. REV. 231,233 (2001); seealso Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing,51 STAN. L. REV. 147, 148 (1998); and Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death
of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. I(1996).
223. CHARLES TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUrPTCY; see also I I U.S.C. §I 129(b)(2)(A) (2002).
224. Id.
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might reemerge to lay claim to future profits made possible by
reinvested dividend distributions.
Without departures from non-bankruptcy priorities, bankruptcy loses
its ability to partition assets. The filing of a bankruptcy petition under
such circumstances would simply be a recognition event, replicating
state law and its priority scheme. Bankruptcy is reduced to a day of
reckoning in which the creditors of the firm get the assets, including the
going concern value of the firm. Indeed the five exceptional cases
described earlier depart from the larger class of cases involving an
insolvent debtor whose claimants are generally satisfied according to
non-bankruptcy priorities.
The distinctive character of bankruptcy is that it offers debtors an
opportunity to partition assets along a different dimension-a temporal
dimension-unavailable under state corporate, contract, or insolvency
law. The frequency with which this opportunity is seized upon dictates
the accuracy with which creditors can price the associated risk.
Commercial landlords have become so familiar with the risk that it
shapes the terms of their leases. Judgment creditors lacking the
opportunity to assess and price the risk of asset partitioning through
bankruptcy are at the mercy of their debtor's ingenuity.
B. FederalBankruptcy versus State Corporationand Consumer Law
A corollary of the observation that corporations may not need
bankruptcy and its asset partitioning abilities, is that entities without
resort to the array of alternatives available to the modern corporation
ought to be able to consider bankruptcy as asset partition. These
include entities using the general partnership or sole proprietorship
forms of commercial organization. But because bankruptcy is, by itself,
just a form of limited liability, these entities need more. In addition to
the defensive asset partitioning afforded by bankruptcy, sole
proprietorships and general partnerships are in need of affirmative asset
partitioning. This affirmative asset partitioning is, for the most part,
only available to these entities through the institution of secured credit.
1. Secured Credit as Affirmative Asset Partition
Alone, bankruptcy would be ineffective as an asset partition.
However, while bankruptcy provides limited liability, secured credit can
provide the other half of the Hansmann-Kraakman equation:
"affirmative asset partitioning," by protecting the assets of the enterprise
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from the personal creditors of the merchant.22
Hansmann and
Kraakman acknowledge the ability of secured credit to perform the task
that they deem "the essential role of organizational law. 226 They
question its effectiveness, however, because of its inability to provide
liquidation protection: assurance that personal creditors of the firm's
owners will not liquidate the business.227
But so what? Is liquidation protection an essential element of effective
affirmative asset partitioning? The only way that Hansmann and
Kraakman can claim that affirmative asset partitioning is the essential
role of organizational law is to also make the claim that liquidation
protection is also essential. If not, then organizational law becomes
merely one of two effective means of affirmative asset partitioning,
standing side by side with secured credit. And on this point Hansmann
and Kraakman are not very persuasive.
Secured credit can effectively sequester assets for the purpose of
bonding, providing assurance to the creditors of the firm that the
personal creditors of the firm's owner will not access the bonding assets.
This is the definition of affirmative asset partitioning."' The only
difference between that afforded by the corporate form and that
afforded by secured credit is that, although creditors can be assured that
they will have resort to a particular pool of assets to protect their
investment, secured credit cannot assure them, or the firm's owners, that
the personal creditors of the firm will not cause the firm to be liquidated.
If creditors merely require a sufficient asset base to extend credit, then
the absence of liquidation protection should not deter them. The
owners of the firm, through liquidation protection, preserves their
control rights, vesting them with the exclusive power to liquidate the
firm. Liquidation protection then, provides value to the owners of the
firm personally, and not to the firm itself The absence of liquidation
protection does not deprive secured credit of its affirmative asset
partitioning ability.
The Hansmann-Kraakman demonstration of the need for effective
asset partitioning provides another, more powerful, yet previously
unconsidered,justification for the existence of secured credit: a need for
effective affirmative asset partitioning. Since secured lending segregates
collateral from the reach of the personal creditors of a firm's owner, it
is a quintessential affirmative asset partitioning device. Hansmann and
Kraakman dismiss its effectiveness as such, since it does not afford the

225.
226.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 395.
Id. at 396.

227. id.
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liquidation protection that the corporate form provides. 229 Nevertheless,
liquidation protection is not the characteristic that defines an affirmative
asset partition, nor is it the quality that makes it "essential. 230 Instead,
the segregation of a pool (or item) of bonding assets (or asset) is what
makes the extension of credit worthwhile in many instances, and that is
effectively what secured credit accomplishes. In fact, it is quite possible
that had secured credit existed in a widespread and trustworthy form in
the early 19th century, the corporation, as we know it, may have never
become the ubiquitous institution we know today.
But corporations have developed and do exist. Given this truth about
the world, then why do we need secured credit in a world where
affirmative asset partitioning is ubiquitous? Because the corporate form
is not for everyone.
Many businesses today operate as sole
proprietorships and simple partnerships. As has long been the case for
these types of businesses, they do not enjoy limited liability, other than
that afforded by bankruptcy's discharge. They do, however, have a
need for credit from time to time, which might be made considerably
cheaper and abundant with the presence of an affirmative asset partition
to set aside bonding assets for the benefit of potential creditors. Secured
credit is effectively the only way that businesses operating as sole
proprietorships or simple partnerships can achieve effective affirmative
asset partitioning. Together, bankruptcy and secured credit provide for
sole proprietorships and partnerships some of the defensive and
affirmative asset partitioning that makes business life affordable and
profitable.
2. Consumer Bankruptcy
The discussion of why bankruptcy and secured credit are necessary
for sole proprietorships and partnerships also suggests yet another
corollary: that individual consumers may not be ideal candidates for the
asset partitioning afforded by bankruptcy. Early English and colonial
American bankruptcy law was, at its very core, business law. When the
Bankruptcy Clause was ratified as part of the Constitution, it was ratified
against a widespread background understanding of bankruptcy as a law
of business: bankruptcy as asset partition.23 ' That asset partition was
necessary and proper, in the minds of the Framers, in large part because
229.

d.at 401.

230. While Hansmann and Kraakman stress that liquidation protection
is important, and v difficult
to acquire without organizational law, at no point do they equate liquidation
protection with affirmative asset
partitioning. Id.
231. WARREN, supra
note 90, at 6.
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the corporate form was, at the time, beyond the imagination of the
Framers. 2 With the advent and refinement of the corporation,
however, two questions arise. First, does bankruptcy law continue to
perform a necessary function as part of the larger body of business law?
The answer to this question, presented in the preceding section, is
"perhaps."
It is certainly necessary if partnership and sole
proprietorship continue to play roles in commerce. It may also be
necessary to supplement the asset partitioning enjoyed by corporations
and their creditors. The second question, one that is much more
difficult to answer, is whether bankruptcy law is now or ever has been
appropriate for individual debtors. In other words, is "consumer
bankruptcy" an oxymoron?
The modem conception of "consumer bankruptcy" appears to
originate, of all places, in the Victorian imagination, and its
manifestation through the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Victorian art and
literature made financial misfortune its central preoccupation. The Mill
on the Floss, Little Dorritt, Great Expectations, Bleak House, and other
classics emphasized the fragility of the human condition in a world
without safe harbors.233 The bankruptcy act of 1898 provided such a
safe harbor to non-trading individuals for the first time in AngloAmerican history, blurring forever our understanding of the distinction
between bankruptcy and insolvency law. 4
Whether the distinction ought to be blurred today is a vexing
question. Recent studies have shown that, with the increasing diffusion
of stock ownership and investment, individuals today have grown
increasingly "mercantile" from a colonial perspective.233 Consumer
bankruptcy also acts 236
as social insurance, particularly in the context of
"catastrophic illness." ' Bankruptcy and its discharge permit society to
shift the cost of such illnesses from the misfortunate victims of the
condition to healthcare providers and their "paying" patients.237 Rather
than run the gauntlet of passing national health insurahce legislation,

232. The first general incorporation statute was enacted by the State of New York in 1811, decades
after the framing of the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I of the Constitution. See note 106, supra, and
accompanying text.
233. See BARBARA WEISS, THEHELLOFTHEENGLSH (I 986)(providing a full exploration ofthe theme
of financial ruin that permeates Victorian art and literature).
234. SKEEL, supa note 11,at 24-46.
233. See Greg Ip, Bear Ravaging PortfoliosUnlikeo to Maul Economy, Even Though Stock Ownership Has Spread,
Most Consumers Don't Feel Affected by it,
TORO.TO GLOBE & MAIL, March 23, 2001, at B 10; see also Susan
Tompor, Taking Stock in Retirement Plans: More People Own Shares than Ever, But That May.,ot Be Enough to Retire
on, ORANGE COUNTY REG., March 26, 2000, at K 13.
236. ToddJ. Zywicki, Bankmptcy Law as Social Legislation, 3 TEX. REv. L. & POLITICS 393, 400 (2001);
EuZABETH WARREN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989).
237. Zywicki, Bankmuptcy Law as Social Legislation, supra note 236, at 401.
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regime applaud its ability
defenders of the current consumer bankruptcy
238
initiative.
an
such
for
to substitute
A recognition of the asset partitioning function of bankruptcy suggests
that the public policy debate over the functions of consumer bankruptcy
Such a
ought to be confronted directly, and democratically.
confrontation may result in a system that provides direct, and more
efficient subsidies to victims of catastrophic illnesses or investors burned
in catastrophic market developments. Investors, in fact, may be able to
preserve resort to bankruptcy, as "sole proprietors" of a sort.
Nevertheless, a vision of bankruptcy as asset partition helps to remove
these public policy questions from behind the veil of obfuscation.
C. The Death ofBankruptcy?
If the central purpose of bankruptcy is to reduce the cost of credit ex
ante, to enable economic activity and to expand social welfare, then one
question remains. What form should bankruptcy law take? The
analysis above suggests that a bankruptcy law that tracked the operation
of state corporate dissolution law, with religious adherence to its priority
scheme, would deprive bankruptcy ofits effectiveness as a temporal asset
partition. Elimination of the potential for debtors to sequester assets
temporally would also bring elimination of the risk premium associated
with bankruptcy's asset partition. A bankruptcy law deprived of its asset
partitioning potential is relegated to the things that bankruptcy does
well, namely, reducing transactions costs, and providing a platform for
the sale of assets. Federal bankruptcy also neatly resolves the sticky
jurisdictional concerns that led to the origin of the equity receivership
in the federal courts.
Current bankruptcy reform legislation appears to be a move to
expand, rather than eliminate, the asset partitioning character of
bankruptcy. Additional special priorities, for automobile lenders, for
example, increase the likelihood of bankruptcy's use as a temporal asset
partitioning device. 239 To the extent that these departures from state
liquidation and priority schemes can be limited or eliminated, the risk
premium associated with bankruptcy as asset partition can be reduced.

238. GROSS, supra note 22, at 16; WARREN ET AL., supra note 236, at 18.
239. SeeS. 220, 107th Cong. (2001).
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CONCLUSION

Bankruptcy is, at its essence, a limited liability device. It differs from
simple insolvency law in that it affords a discharge that lowers an
impenetrable veil between past creditors and future possibilities. It does
this without imposing an insolvency requirement. Insolvency law, on
the other hand, resolves claims between debtors and creditors without
the imposition of the temporal shield of a discharge. Accordingly, most
insolvents never enter the realm of bankruptcy, or enjoy the protection
of its discharge. The absence of an insolvency requirement in American
bankruptcy law also means that some debtors who make use of the
bankruptcy system do so without genuine concern for impending
insolvency, or the common pool problem that such an insolvency might
entail. In short, most insolvent debtors never go bankrupt, and some
bankrupt debtors are not insolvent.
This Article shows that the use of bankruptcy by solvent debtors
reveals the true nature of bankruptcy law as business law. Bankruptcy,
through its discharge, is a limited liability device. Solvent debtors use
bankruptcy as a drastic limited liability measure, to protect going
concern value and its future income stream from past creditors. The
five examples explored in this Article are not intended to comprise an
exhaustive list of categories. Instead, they are offered as evidence of the
prevailing understanding of the function of bankruptcy, and the diversity
of circumstances under which its limited liability power is invoked.
The use of bankruptcy as a limited liability device is not necessarily
problematic. The frequency with which solvent debtors invoke the
limited liability afforded by bankruptcy may allow creditors to price the
risk of this use of bankruptcy. Retail real estate lease rejection provides
an example of such a market adjustment. Other limitations on liability
exist in nature, and, as has been shown through the history of English
and early American bankruptcy law, limited liability is very important
for the development of commerce. In fact, bankruptcy may be the only
limitation on liability afforded unincorporated businesses, such as
partnerships and sole proprietorships. The effective, albeit drastic, asset
partition afforded by bankruptcy, when coupled with the institution of
secured credit, may be necessary to make the conduct of business as a
partnership or sole proprietorship feasible. Corporations, on the other
hand, already enjoy effective asset partitioning through organizational
law. Bankruptcy adds a more dramatic layer of asset partitioning, with
a temporal dimension. Where bankruptcy law departs from the priority
scheme dictated by state law, and imposes no insolvency requirement,
bankruptcy permits debtors the opportunity to sequester assets along a
temporal plane. If the central purpose of bankruptcy is to lower the cost
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of credit ex ante, then this purpose is undermined by the temporal asset
partitioning character of bankruptcy law, which imposes an additional
risk premium upon the cost of credit.

